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FROM DE FACTO TO STATUTORY EXEMPTION: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POLICY
REGARDING THE FEDERAL TAXATION OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum*
H OW should candidates, contributors, campaign organizations,
and other political entities be taxedT One would have ex-
pected this question to have been thoroughly debated and resolved
prior to the legislation of any scheme of taxation, especially in view
of the two vital and potentially conflicting interests at stake: (1)
assuring a political process free from interference by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), and (2) maintaining the flow of tax reve-
nue and preventing the manipulation of the political process for the
purpose of sheltering income. This article argues, however, that
Congress never has confronted-or shown any inclination to con-
sider-the fundamental question of the proper relationship be-
tween federal taxation and the political process.2 Rather, for a long
period Congress was content to engage in successive ad hoc accom-
modations with the IRS, with the objective of preserving a system
of de facto tax exemption for campaign finance activities. When
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 1970;
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1973.
' Most campaign funds have been raised and expended through committees. Political
committees generally fall within one of three categories: single-candidate committees; multi-
candidate committees, including political action committees (PACs) organized by corpora-
tions and unions; and national, congressional, state, district, and local party committees. See
generally 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 718, 719-20 (1978). Recently, a multitude of committees
have been created to serve two ethically questionable functions: (1) bypassing federal and
state ceilings on amounts that an individual contributor can transfer to a candidate, and (2)
obscuring information that must be disclosed to campaign finance regulatory bodies by over-
whelming the agencies with documents. See D. ADAmANY & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY 83-
94 (1975); H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1972 ELECTION 12-19 (1976); CONGRESSIONAL QUART-
ERLY INC., II DOLLAR POLITICS 5-8 (1974) [hereinafter cited as II DOLLAR PoLIcIS]; Bicks &
Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Misguided Morality, 28
N.Y.U.L. REv. 975, 984-92 (1953).
2 Similarly, commentators have focused almost exclusively on the technical aspects of this
delicate relationship. See, e.g., Golden, Federal Taxation and the Political Process, 24 KAN.
L. REV. 221 (1976); Kaplan, Taxation and Political Campaigns: Interface Resolved, 53 TAXES
340 (1975); Schaut, Taxable Entities and Politics, 52 TAXES 644 (1974); Streng, The Federal
Tax Treatment of Political Contributions and Political Organizations, 29 TAX LAW. 139
(1975). For a discussion of the role of taxation in campaign finance from a broader and less
technical perspective, see Boehm, Taxes and Politics, 22 TAx L. REv. 369 (1967).
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informal ad hoc agreements finally became unworkable in the early
1970's, Congress hastily transformed the de facto tax exemption
into a more permanent statutory exemption of the political process.
But ironically, while the current statutory scheme3 ostensibly
exempts many contributors and political organizations from taxa-
tion, it actually invites vast new IRS involvement in the political
process. This result presents a striking contrast to the noninter-
ference historically cultivated by Congress.
This article first explores the development of the de facto system
of tax exemption and identifies the tensions that led to its demise.
The analysis then details the substitution of a statutory structure
in place of the traditional informal arrangement and examines the
potential present in that structure for substantial IRS interference
in the political process.
I. THE DE FACTO SYSTEM OF TAX EXEMPTION
A full understanding of the current statutory structure requires an
appreciation of Congress's historical aversion to any tax legislation
that would affect adversely the political process. For decades one
overriding concern has guided Congress: assuring a maximum, un-
fettered flow of campaign funds. Despite occasional pronounce-
ments advocating reform,4 the legislative branch has shown little
3 The term "scheme" is rather a misnomer because although several scattered Internal
Revenue Code sections deal with particular aspects of campaign finance, no coordinated
regime of taxation exists. The most prominent provision, I.R.C. § 527, exempts qualifying
organizations from income taxation, but the standards for qualification are vague and remain
largely within IRS discretion. See text accompanying notes 130-41 infra. Similarly, although
I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5) exempts transfers to political organizations from gift tax, the meaning of
the term "political organization" is unsettled. Adding to the uncertainty, several sections use.
the expression "political party," I.R.C. §§ 271, 276, which may have a different meaning
than the term "political organization." Compare I.R.C. § 271(b)(1) with id. § 527(e) (1). I.R.C.
§ 41 provides a limited credit for political contributions. See text accompanying notes 126-
30 infra. Finally, I.R.C. § 9006(a), in combination with § 6096(a), provides campaign funding
for qualifying Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates through a one dollar check-off
option on personal income tax forms.
In contrast to these benefits, I.R.C. § 84 treats the contribution of property with a fair
market value exceeding the property's adjusted basis as a taxable sale. See text accompany-
ing notes 122-29 infra. I.R.C. § 271 disallows the bad debt deduction normally available under
§ 166 if the debt is owed by a political party. See text accompanying notes 26-31 infra.
Similarly, I.R.C. § 276 denies deductions for advertisements in political journals and for
tickets to entertainment events in cases in which the proceeds benefit a political party or
candidate. See text accompanying notes 32-34 infra.
4 Legislative pronouncements supporting campaign finance reform rarely lead to effective
remedial action. See H. ALExANDER, MONEY IN POLrrICS 198-229 (1972). For a particularly
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initiative in eliminating tax abuse or in closing tax loopholes in the
campaign finance area. Indeed, Congress has acted only under in-
tense public pressure or in response to abrupt changes in IRS policy.
In contrast, the legislature has not hesitated to use taxation to in-
crease the supply of campaign funds.5
A. Phase I: 1913-1952
For nearly forty years, from the enactment of the first modern
income tax laws in 1913 until 1952,6 Congress ignored the issue of
the proper tax treatment of the individuals and organizations fi-
nancing the electoral process. Legislative neglect of the campaign
finance system is illustrated by Congress's treatment of four aspects
of campaign funding: (1) income of political organizations, (2) loans
made to campaign committees, (3) advertising in party publica-
tions, and (4) gifts of appreciated property.
During this period, the Internal Revenue Code made no reference
to the income taxation of candidates, campaign committees, full-
fledged political organizations, or any other political groups. Under
the traditional inclusive definition of taxable income, any. income
attributable to these putative taxpayers should have been subject
cynical, Marxist view of the "politics" of campaign reform, see D. NICHOLS, FINANCING
ELECTIONS 150-53 (1974).
1 A number of Internal Revenue Code provisions were designed to stimulate campaign
funding. See I.R.C. §§ 41, 218 (affording an income tax credit or deduction to contributors);
id. § 527(g) (exempting candidates' and elected officials' newsletter funds and permitting
credits and deductions for contributions to such funds); id. §§ 9001-9042 (establishing a fund
to distribute to Presidential campaigns money collected through a check-off option on indi-
vidual tax returns). See generally Comment, Tax Subsidies for Political Participation, 31 TAX
LAW. 461 (1978).
Apparently, the credit and deduction provisions, however, have not stimulated political
contributions to any appreciable degree. As one noted authority recently has concluded, "the
evidence suggests that both credit and deduction are simply irrelevant to their stated pur-
pose." Adamany, The Failure of Tax Incentives for Political Giving, 7 TAX NOTES 3, 4 (1978).
The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, repealed the deduction. Al-
though the check-off system seems to have attracted somewhat broader participation from
all income groups, this conclusion must be tested over a longer period of time. Adamany,
supra, at 5.
4 The sixteenth amendment, permitting Congress "to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration," became effective on February 25, 1913. U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI. See also B. BrrrIKa & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 3
(4th ed. 1972). Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the 1913 Income Tax, which made no
reference to the income taxation of campaign finance. The gift tax, which has been in continu-
ous effect in various forms since 1924, also fails to address the matter. See generally R. PAUL,
* FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 15.01 (1942); S. SuRREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL
& H. AULT, I FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 8-11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as I FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION].
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to taxation.7 Such income could take any of a number of forms. A
political organization endowed with a surplus after a campaign
might earn income by investing contributions or realize capital gain
by selling contributed property.8 Although classifying a political
organization as a particular type of entity for tax purposes might
have presented substantial difficulties, 9 the taxable status of an
7 I.R.C. § 61(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means
all income from whatever source derived .... " In the landmark case Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of § 22(a),
the predecessor of § 61(a) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as being as broad as
Congress's taxing power, rejecting the contention that the punitive damages portion of an
antitrust recovery is not includable in gross income.
Of course, no taxation question would have arisen if political organizations had been specif-
ically exempted from taxation. Statutory exemption, however, did not exist until Congress
enacted the Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 10(a), 88 Stat. 2108 (current version at
I.R.C. § 527) [hereinafter referred to as the Upholstery Regulators Act], expressly exempting
political organizations from income taxation on certain receipts.
Alternatively, if classified as gifts for income tax purposes, political contributions would
be excluded frbm the gross income of the donee pursuant to I.R.C. § 102. Whether a receipt
qualifies as a gift depends upon whether the transfer to the donee is made out of" 'detached
and disinterested generosity.'" See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960)
(quoting Commissioner v. LaBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)). Cf. Olk v. United States, 536
F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U5. 920 (1977) (tokes received by casino craps
dealer given not out of 'detached and disinterested generosity,' but rather as a "[tiribute to
the gods of fortune which it is hoped will be returned bounteously . . ."). But see Stratton
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 255, 281 (1970), acq. and nonacq. on other grounds 1970-2 C.B. xxi,
xxii (establishing that transfers to former Illinois Governor William Stratton, although not
campaign contributions, were intended for his unrestricted personal use and therefore were
excludable from inbome under I.R.C. § 102 as a nontaxable gift).
8 But see Rogovin, Revenuers vs. Republicans, TH7E NEw RPPuuc, July 7, 1973, at 16, 18.
After the 1968 Presidential election the Republican Finance Committee had a $1.8 million
surplus, which was placed in safe-deposit boxes rather than invested. Apparently the com-
mittee sought to avoid filing a Fiduciary Income Tax Return, which the IRS had suggested
might be required for investment income of political organizations. See notes 46-48 infra and
accompanying text.
Whether a political organization is classified as an association or a trust has major income
tax consequences for the organization. Associations generally are treated as corporations,
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3), while trusts normally are subject to the provisions governing individuals,
I.R.C. § 641(a). As a result, associations receive the benefit of the historically lower corporate
income tax rate. The Revenue Act of 1978 will exacerbate this disparity in the treatment of
associations and trusts. Compare I.R.C. §1(e), as amended by Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-600, § 101(a), 92 Stat. 2763, with I.R.C. § 11, as amended by Revenue Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 301, 92 Stat. 2763.
I.R.C.§ 527 treats political organizations as associations, with certain modifications. See
notes 94-104 infra and accompanying text. In contrast, shortly before the enactment of § 527,
the IRS had proposed to tax political organizations as corporations, and candidates' segre-
gated campaign funds as trusts. See Rev. Rul. 74-23, 1974-1 C.B. 17; Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1
C.B. 14. This dual approach departed from an earlier IRS position that permitted political
committees, but not segregated funds, to report on a Fiduciary Income Tax Return income
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organization's income should have been beyond question. Nonethe-
less, the Service treated such income as functionally tax exempt.'0
Moreover, the IRS made no serious effort to tax contributions, al-
though contributions, as well as income earned from them, were
susceptible to taxation under a number of theories."
The precise motivation behind IRS policy and congressional iner-
tia during this period remains unclear. Quite plausibly it was the
outgrowth of an implicit modus vivendi between the Service and
Congress: perhaps the Service was anxious to avoid auditing those
who control IRS purse strings and Congress found de facto tax ex-
emption a benefit much too attractive to eliminate. Whatever the
motivation, the outcome was clear. The IRS policy of nonenforce-
ment, coupled with congressional lassitude, effectively exempted
most campaign finance from income taxation.'2
earned on bank accounts containing unexpended contributions. Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B.
810, 811.
The classification difficulties arise primarily because political organizations do not fall
neatly within either category-trust or association. Unlike the typical trust, few political
organizations comply with trust formalities or aim to preserve a corpus for beneficiaries. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 (1967). Likewise, political organizations rarely incorporate or carry
on business for profit, an essential attribute of all taxable associations. See Streng, supra note
2, at 154-57; Tannenbaum, Taxation of Political Campaign Committees and Political Parties,
in TAXATION WVTH REPRESENTATION, THE TAX TR ATmENT OF PoLmcAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND
GROuPs at 72-526 (1972); Note, Campaign Financing and Democracy: Limiting Tax Benefits
for the Affluent Contributor, 59 IOWA L. REV. 323, 330-33 (1973).
11 In enforcing the income tax laws the IRS has distinguished, however, between legitimate
fundraising groups and organizations formed merely to exploit the tax benefits afforded
political groups. The Service never has hesitated to include contributions "diverted from the
channel of campaign activity and used by the political candidate for any personal purpose"
in the candidate's gross income. Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B. 810. See also Rev. Rul. 54-
80, 1954-1 C.B. 11; I.T. 3276, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 1) 108. Courts have endorsed the Service's
position and have placed on the candidate the burden of establishing the propriety of expend-
itures. See, e.g., United States v. Jett, 352 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
935 (1966); O'Dwyer v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 862
(1959); Reichert v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1027 (1953).
" See note 7 supra.
22 The IRS does have at least a tradition of enforcement with regard to the gift tax. See
Rev. Rul. 59-57, 1959-1 C.B. 626 (conclusory statement that political contributions are subject
to gift tax). Although Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532, indicated that the Service's policy
of enforcing the gift tax on political contributions was traceable to the 1932 enactment of the
current gift tax, one commentator has asserted that this position was at best informal until
1956. See Streng, supra note 2, at 172, 183. The Tax Court recently supported Professor
Streng's view in Carson v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 252 (1978):
From 1924, when the gift tax was first enacted, until 1959, the Service issued no
regulations or rulings indicating that campaign contributions were subject to the gift
tax. It was not until 1959 that [the IRS] issued a revenue ruling simply declaring,
without the benefit of any analysis, that campaign contributions are subject to the gift
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The IRS assumed a similar nonenforcement posture regarding
loans made to campaign organizations. Major contributors typically
made substantial unsecured "loans" to candidates, never intending
that the loans be repaid.' 3 The Service should have questioned
whether these contributions were genuine loans for adequate consid-
eration, and in cases in which the payments were not bona fide
loans, whether the contributor was subject to gift tax or the candi-
date to income tax." Without confronting these basic tax questions,
the IRS accepted characterizations of the contributions as loans' 5
-despite persuasive evidence that such characterizations were un-
warranted. When these loans were dishonored, each contributor
claimed a bad debt deduction, thus reducing the cost of the con-
tribution."6 High bracket taxpayers were presented with major
tax . . . The absence of any decided cases on the point during this long period of
time also demonstrates that [the IRS] was not administratively applying the gift tax
to campaign contributions.
Id. at 147 (footnote omitted). For an analysis of Carson, see Schoenblum, The Changing
Meaning of "Gift". An Analysis of the Tax Court's Decision in Carson v. Commissioner, 32
VAND. L. Rav. 641 (1979).
13 For a more complete discussion of this practice, see Bloom, Tax Results of Political
Contributions, 36 B.U.L. REV. 170, 175 (1956); Boehm, supra note 2, at 388-96.
4 The principle that a bad debt deduction can be claimed only for a bona fide debt and
not for what is essentially an advance, gift, or contribution to capital is well-established
outside the campaign finance context. See, e.g., Alexander & Baldwin v. Kanne, 190 F.2d
153 (9th Cir. 1951) (holding funds a capital contribution, considering the absence of true
debtor-creditor relationship necessary for debt to be deductible); Du Pont v. Commissioner,
36 B.T.A. 223 (1937) (holding payments an advance, because repayment not expected);
Grossman v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 643 (1927) (holding money a gift, based on presumption
that a transfer from parent to child is either a gift or an advance).
In one case the IRS did challenge a bad debt deduction for money advanced to a campaign
committee for George Peddy, the losing candidate for United States Senator from Texas in
1922. The taxpayer was to be repaid out of later contributions, funds that never materialized.
The Board of Tax Appeals found the debt invalid because the committee never had agreed
to assume personal liability on the obligation. Cullinan v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 930, 932
(1930). The Cullinan decision merely ensured that contributors would take promissory notes
and otherwise observe the formalities associated with debt obligations. See notes 26-31 infra
and accompanying text.
'1 Often the lender received a nonrecourse obligation in exchange for his loan and enter-
tained no serious expectation of repayment. For example, in 1940 Marshall Field, the promi-
nent Chicago financier, "loaned" the New York State Democratic Committee $50,000. In 1948
the committee informed Field that there would be no payments made on the promissory note.
He finally received 10 cents on the dollar as part of a general settlement with the other major
creditors of the committee. See Letter from Deputy Commissioner E.I. McLarney to Marshall
Field (May 18, 1949), reprinted in 98 CONG. REc. 4544 (1952) (approving the claim of a bad
debt deduction).
1s The bad debt deduction was taken under § 23(k)(1) of the 1939 Code. Int. Rev. Code of
1939, ch. 1, § 23(k)(1), 53 Stat. 1 (current version at I.R.C. § 166).
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incentives to finance campaigns, for in many cases contributors in-
curred a net cost as low as 10%17 and avoided entirely the gift tax
payable on political contributions.
For many years contributors benefited from an advertising loop-
hole as well as from this treatment of campaign loans. The Tillman
Act 8 prohibited corporations from contributing directly to political
campaigns." To bypass this restriction and simultaneously to derive
11 Without the deduction, a $40,000 contribution would cost the contributor the full
$40,000. With the deduction, a taxpayer in the 90% bracket would enjoy a tax savings of
$36,000, reducing the net cost of the contribution to $4,000. The example is not farfetched:
a marginal rate hovering around 90% was the rule during the 1940's and early 1950's for tax-
able income exceeding $200,000. See J. MERTENs, I Tim LAw OF FEDRmiA INcoME TAXATION
§ 2.03 (rev. ed. 1974).
'1 Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976)).
It This prohibition arose from populist sentiment against corporations suspected of making
substantial contributions to elected officials who "were basically on the payrolls of these
various large corporations." Weiss, Federal Tax Reform-The Need for Change in the Financ-
ing of Political Campaigns, 61 NAT'L TAX Assoc. PROC. 470, 474-75 (1968). Notorious robber
baron Mark Hanna reportedly established an industry-by-industry system of exactions, dis-
tributing the funds to select candidates. See G. TIAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TREE? 48-
52 (1973). Richard Nixon's personal attorney, Herbert Kalmbach, apparently handled a
variation of this scheme in the 1972 Presidential campaign. See II DOLLAR PoLrTICS, supra note
1, at 65.
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, tit. III, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (repealed
1972), broadened the Tillman Act prohibition in two significant ways: the statute used the
term "contribution" rather than "money contribution," and penalties were extended to the
recipients of contributions as well as to the donors.
In 1943 Congress extended the Federal Corrupt Practices Act provision to include labor
unions, War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163 (1943) (amending Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, ch. 368, tit. III, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925)), largely a reaction to massive C.I.O.
expenditures in a particular campaign. Weiss, supra, at 474-75. Congress later incorporated
this temporary wartime measure into the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act), ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (amending Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368,
tit. III, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925)) (repealed 1972).
The broad prohibition against corporate and union contributions was repealed with the
enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,.§ 405, 86 Stat.
3 (1972) (repealing Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, tit. III, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925))
(repealed 1976). Congress retained the prohibition against "contributions or expenditures,"
but excluded from the definition of contributions and expenditures communications by
corporations'to shareholders and their families and by labor organizations to members and
their families soliciting individual contributions. The Act also permitted expenditures
for the establishment and administration of segregated funds and for soliciting contribu-
tions, as well as for "nonpartisan" registration campaigns directed at shareholders, union
members, and their families. Id. § 205. See generally Sproul, A Primer for Corporate and
Union Political Action Committees (pt. 1), 24 PRAC. LAw, no. 5, at 39 (1978); Comment,
Corporate Political Action Committees: Effect of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1976, 26 CATH. U.L. REv. 756 (1977); Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal
Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. Cm. L. REv.
148 (1974); Note, Corporate and Union Political Contributions and Expenditures Under
1979]
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tax benefits, businesses purchased "advertisements" in political
party journals and national convention programs. 20 Once classified
as advertising expenditures, these payments could be deducted as
business expenses although they simply represented an indirect
way of making corporate contributions at a reduced cost.21 Despite
common knowledge of the practice, neither Congress nor the IRS
took steps to eliminate it.
The de facto tax exemption of political organizations gave the
contribution of appreciated property an appeal distinct from that
2 U.S.C. § 441b: A Constitutional Analysis, 21 UTAH L. REv. 291, 292-302 (1977).
Recently, the Supreme Court considered a state law prohibiting a corporation from making
expenditures to publicize its views on a referendum proposal. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978). In that case, the Court held that the restriction unconstitutionally
interfered with the corporation's exercise of its first amendment rights. The Court expressly
distinguished the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, however, emphasizing that the
"consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest implies
no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign
for election to public office." Id. at 788 n.26.
The Federal Election Campaign Act provisions have spurred the development of PACs: by
1976, 450 corporate PACs were registered with the Federal Election Commission. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 1977, § L, at 1, col. 4. The Federal Election Commission's favorable attitude
also has contributed to this proliferation. See, e.g., FEC Adv. Op. 1975-23, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,584
(1975), in which the Commission approved a Sun Oil Company proposal to use general funds
to establish, administer, and solicit voluntary contributions for a PAC. On the day of the Sun
Oil decision, 137 corporate PACs registered with the Commission. See Boggs, PACs: Business
Political Renaissance, 14 TRiAL, no. 1, at 5-6 (1978). Prohibited from making direct contribu-
tions, corporations and unions establish PACs and solicit donations from shareholders, em-
ployees, and their families. PACs distribute the funds to candidates, subject to ceilings placed
on contribution size. In 1976 general elections, for example, corporate and business trade
PACs contributed $6.9 million, and labor PACs $8.1 million, to congressional candidates. For
a current, astute analysis of PAC activity, see 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 849 (1978).
20 In 1936 the Democratic Party received $250,000 from advertisements sold at $2,500 per
page in Book of the Democratic Convention of 1936. G. THAYER, supra note 19, at 71. By 1966
the price per page had risen 600% to $15,000. See note 33 infra.
21 During the 1950's a series of court decisions and IRS rulings recognized the deductibility
of expenditures on political journal advertisements, but only in limited circumstances. See,
e.g., Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 528 (1957), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959), acq. 1958-2 C.B. 5 (permitting deduction for payments for
legitimate advertising in the 1948 Democratic National Convention program; finding no
evidence of a disguised contribution). Accord, Wolkowitz v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH)
754,768 (1949) (finding advertisement in local New Jersey political club's dance program
placed "in good faith with the expectation of results similar to those derived from advertising
in other mediums").
The Service has established a parallel line of authority. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-343, 1956-2
C.B. 115 (holding expenditures for advertisements in national political convention programs
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses pursuant to I.R.C. § 162(a) if expend-
itures are reasonable in amount, bear a direct relation to the advertiser's business, and do
not exceed the value of the advertising space acquired).
520
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of loans and advertising. 22 A contributor could donate the equivalent
of a cash contribution in highly appreciated property having a low
basis. The contributor would treat the transaction as a gift,2 avoid-
ing income tax on the appreciation because the transaction did not
qualify as a sale or exchange. Although as donee the political organi-
zation would have to take the contributor's basis in the property,
the tax-exempt status of the organization meant that the donee
would realize no gain when it disposed of the property for cash.
Using this technique, a campaign contributor could make a contri-
bution at a substantial tax saving,24 while the political organization
obtained and sold tax-free property more valuable than any contri-
bution the organization otherwise might have received from the
same donor. Several million dollars of capital gain obviously were
escaping untaxed,2s but Congress took no action and the Service
continued to recognize the tax-exempt status of political organiza-
tions.
B. Phase ff: 1952-1967
In the period between 1952 and 1967, the de facto system of tax
exemption remained largely intact. Congress was compelled to act,
however, on two distinct occasions-to close first the campaign loan
loophole and later the advertising loophole. In each case dramatic
public disclosures, accompanied by the efforts of a single Senator,
triggered the legislative reform. This legislative activity, however,
21 Appreciated property is property that has increased in value since its acquisition. Upon
the disposition of appreciated property, the taxpayer ordinarily would be taxed on the gain
realized, i.e., the difference between the original cost of acquiring the property, with certain
adjustments, and the value of cash and property received upon its disposition. See I.R.C.
§§ 1001(a), 1011, 1012.
2 On transfers classified as gifts, the taxpayer could claim an annual exclusion of $3,000
per donee, see I.R.C. § 2503(b), as well as a $30,000 lifetime exemption, Int. Rev. Code of
1954, ch. 736, § 2521, 68A Stat. 410 (repealed 1976)(effective for gifts made prior to Jan. 1,
1977). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 substituted for the $30,000 lifetime exemption a unified
gift-estate tax credit that will reach $47,000 by 1981. I.R.C. § 2505(a)-(b). This is roughly
equivalent to a $175,000 exemption.
24 A contributor planning to donate $20,000 to a political organization might own, for
example, a rapidly appreciating capital asset that he had purchased at $5,000 and that is
currently worth $20,000. If he contributed the cash proceeds from a sale of the asset, he might
pay a tax close to $7,000 on the sale, taking into account capital gains tax and various tax
preferences. In addition, he would be liable for gift tax on the transfer of the cash. By making
a gift of the property itself, he would avoid the income tax incurred on a sale, although he
might be liable for gift tax on the transfer.
2Transfers of appreciated property to political organizations cost the Treasury approxi-
mately $5 million in revenue during the 1972 election year. 119 CONG. REC. 27469 (1973).
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responded directly to particular well-publicized examples of tax
abuse and did not entail any comprehensive review of the proper
relationship between the tax laws and the political process.
During the 1952 Presidential campaign, while the Democratic
Party still controlled the executive branch of government, intima-
tions of IRS sleight of hand in the issuance of certain private letter
rulings surfaced. These suggestions erupted into a major embarrass-
ment when Republican Senator John Williams questioned the pro-
priety of the rulings on the floor of the Senate. 21 Issued to three
prominent Democratic Party contributors-Richard G. Reynolds,27
Marshall Field,28 and David Schulte 2 -the rulings provided that the
substantial uncollected "loans" the three had made to the Demo-
cratic Party would not be deemed taxable gifts and could be de-
ducted as bad debts. Senator Williams was openly attacking the
well-established practice of denominating campaign contributions
as loans. The Senator not only questioned the bona fide nature of
the loans, but also detailed the rather dubious procedural aspects
of one of the rulings. This ruling had been "issued less than 48 hours
after the application was received in Washington. . . . [C]ertain
26 98 CONG. REC. 4543-44 (1952). Senator Williams apparently recalled that less than two
years earlier, in a ruling issued on September 22, 1950, the IRS had denied deductions to
purchasers of tickets to a Republican Party dinner. See Boehm, supra note 2, at 389 n.79.
27 On December 28, 1948, Reynolds, of the Reynolds tobacco empire, sought a ruling regard-
ing the deductibility of the unrepaid portion of loans that he had made to the Democratic
State Committee of New York. Reynolds had received three demand notes in amounts total-
ing $270,000 from the New York committee. The ruling request indicated that the notes had
been issued with expectation of repayment in annual installments, that unsuccessful de-
mands for repayment had been made, and that the committee had insufficient assets to repay
the amounts owed. The committee had offered Reynolds a settlement at the rate of 10 cents
on the dollar.
On December 30, 1948-one day before the close of the calendar tax year and less than 48
hours after the submission of the ruling request-E.I. McLarney, deputy commissioner of the
IRS, personally indicated to Reynolds that thd difference between the "loan" and the pro-
ceeds from the settlement would be deductible as a nonbusiness bad debt. See 98 CONG. REC.
4543-45 (1952).
2 In 1940 Field made a $50,000 loan to the New York State Democratic Committee, receiv-
ing a promissory note in exchange. As part of the settlement with Reynolds, the committee
offered Field 10 cents on the dollar. Deputy Commissioner McLarney determined that the
unrepaid portion of Field's "loan" also was deductible. Id.
21 Schulte, described as a "New York tycoon," Boehm, supra note 2, at 389, had advanced
$50,000 to the New York committee during the 1944 campaign with the understanding that
the committee would repay the advance gradually, as funds became available after the
campaign. Schulte never received any repayment, and in 1948 he was asked to accept the
same settlement offer that was made to Reynolds and Field. The IRS also approved Schulte's
claim of a bad debt deduction for the unrepaid portion of the advance. 98 CONG. REc. 4583
(1952).
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officials in the [IRS could] recollect a conference having been held
relative to this decision, but so far they [had] been unable to find
any minutes of such conference, nor [could] anyone remember who
participated . "..."30
During the same period, Senator Williams introduced and lob-
bied for a bill to prohibit bad debt deductions for unrepaid loans to
political candidates and organizations. Against a background of the
public attention generated by Williams' expos6, the lack of per-
suasive explanations for the rulings, and the Republican congres-
sional majority's desire to embarrass the Democratic Party during
an election year, the Williams proposal finally was enacted despite
some stiff initial opposition. 31 Although Senator Williams' bill
closed one avenue of tax avoidance, the bill was a particularized
response motivated largely by partisan concerns. Congress made no
attempt to confront other areas of abuse or the more fundamental
question of the proper role of taxation in the political system. As a
result, a trifurcated system was in operation following the enact-
ment of the Williams legislation: a statutory taxation scheme that
did not exempt expressly the income of political organizations; a de
facto arrangement that not only exempted such income, but also
tolerated specious deductions for contributors; and a statutory pro-
vision barring one of these sham deductions while ignoring the oth-
ers.
In 196632 a second abuse attracted widespread public attention,
shaking the traditional accommodation between Congress and the
Service once more. Senator Williams again led the reform effort,
this time against corporations that were claiming deductions for
advertising in party publications. The technique had become so
popular that corporations were paying as much as $15,000 per page
to advertise in party journals. 33 Repeating the strategy used success-
3 98 CoNG. Rac. 4543 (1952).
11 During May of 1952, Senator Williams proposed a number of bills to curtail bad debt
deductions for what were essentially contributions. He met resistance in both the Senate
Finance Committee and the House Committee on Ways and Means. Following reports that
the House committee planned no action during 1952, Williams managed to bring his bill to
the floor of the Senate. Id. at 8279. Congress enacted the measure shortly thereafter.
Legislative Branch Appropriation Act of 1953, ch. 598, 66 Stat. 464 (1952) (amending I.R.C.
§ 23(k)(6)) (current version at I.R.C. § 271). See Boehm, supra note 2, at 393.
2 Between 1952 and 1966, the Service's principal campaign finance concern was curtailing
candidates' personal use of funds contributed to campaign organizations. See note 10 supra.
13 Boehm, supra note 2, at 396. For example, the Democratic State Committees on Voter
Education published Toward an Age of Greatness, a flashy magazine of 178 pages. The
magazine contained laudatory articles on the current administration's personnel, as well as
1979]
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fully in the political loan disclosures scandal, Senator Williams
questioned on the floor of the Senate the propriety of these disguised
corporate contributions. After public exposure of the suspicious ex-
penditures, legislation to prohibit tax deductions for advertisements
in party publications passed both houses of Congress with little
opposition. 4 Congress again failed, however, to consider any com-
prehensive scheme for the taxation of campaign finance activities.
C. Phase III: 1967-1974
By 1967 the de facto income tax exemption for political candi-
dates, organizations, and contributors had survived for more than
68 full-page advertisements. A one page advertisement sold for $15,000, as compared with
$5,000 for a comparable page in Time. In terms of readership, the advertiser was spending
$60 per thousand readers, as compared to $5 per thousand readers for a Time advertisement.
Not surprisingly, many of the advertisers were government contractors. 112 CONG. REc. 1237-
40 (1966).
Not only the Democrats charged exorbitant rates for advertisements appearing in political
party journals. In 1964 the Republican Party published Congress-The Heartbeat of
Government, charging $10,000 per advertising page. By the time a second edition appeared
in 1966, the advertising rate had increased to $15,000 per page. See Boehm, supra note 2, at
397 n.93. See also Pence, Financing Our Parties, T11E REPORTER, Feb. 10, 1966, at 29, 33.
11 Senator Williams minced no words, specifically charging that the Toward an Age of
Greatness concept was a "shakedown" of corporations with government contracts. 112 CONG.
REc. 1237 (1966). The amendment was enacted within two months of its proposal. Tax
Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-368, § 301, 80 Stat. 38 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 276(b)(1)). This second Williams amendment disallowed deductions for advertising in
convention programs and other political publications in cases in which the proceeds would
benefit a party or a candidate. Proceeds from admission to dinners, programs, or inaugural
events also would be nondeductible if they benefited a party or a candidate. Even when an
advertiser could establish an expectation of significant business benefit, nondeductibility
would remain the rule. See S. REP. No. 1010, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41, reprinted in [1966]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 1985, 2016-18.
In June of 1968, just a few months before the national elections, Congress amended the
statute again to permit deductions for advertisements in convention programs. Act of June
18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-346, 82 Stat. 183. The deduction, however, was available only to the
extent that the funds were used to defray the costs of a convention to nominate a Presidential
and Vice-Presidential candidate. Although ostensibly a restrictive provision, the amendment
afforded significant benefits: funds that ordinarily would have defrayed convention expenses
could be used elsewhere. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 474. Moreover, the law permitted
retroactive deductibility for sums contributed as early as January 1, 1968. Although limited
benefit could be derived in 1968 because of the short interval between the passage of the law
and the conventions, a total of $274,500 nevertheless was paid for advertising. By 1972 this
figure had jumped to $2.6 million. H. ALEXANDR, supra note 1, at 248-51.
The convention program advertising deduction was repealed in 1974, Upholstery Regula-
tors Act, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 10(b), 88 Stat. 2108 (1975), by the passage of amendments to
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 that provided for complete financing for Presiden-
tial nominating conventions. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-443, § 406, 88 Stat. 1263 (current version at I.R.C. § 9008).
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fifty years with only minor modifications. Although statutory
amendments had eliminated two of the more striking abuses, others
persisted. 5 De facto insulation of campaign finance activities from
the taxation process ended, however, during the next seven years.
Significantly, this change was unrelated to a searching inquiry into
the costs and benefits of taxing political organizations. Rather, a
series of public attacks on IRS credibility compelled the Service to
abandon its long-standing accommodation with Congress and to
commence enforcement of the tax laws with regard to political enti-
ties.
1. Uneven IRS Enforcement: Communist Party v. Commissioner"
The ongoing conflict between the IRS and the Communist Party
during the 1950's and 1960's contrasted sharply with the Service's
hands-off policy toward other political parties. Direct IRS action
against the party began in 1954, the height of the McCarthy period.
In that year, the IRS ordered an audit of the party's books, ostensi-
bly because the organization had not filed income tax or exempt
organization returns for 1951.17 Pressed to produce records, includ-
ing documents that would reveal the sources of its income, the party
claimed that it maintained only those records needed for payroll
purposes. 3 After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain information suf-
ficient to reconstruct the party's taxable income, the Service substi-
tuted an alternative figure based on unexplained bank credits and
issued a statutory notice of deficiency.39 Because failure to oppose
the Service's position could have resulted not only in tax liability
" Because political organizations remained tax-exempt, the loophole for contributions of
appreciated property still was available. Moreover, corporations found other devices to avoid
the prohibition against contributions. A corporation could "loan" employees to a candidate
while continuing to pay and deduct the employees' salaries. Alternatively, a corporation
might hire a campaign worker and pay him a "deductible" salary, but leave the employee's
time free for campaign activities. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 475-76.
" 373 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1967). For earlier incarnations of this case, involving primarily
the same set of operative facts, see Communist Party v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 325 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); Communist Party v. Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Communist Party
v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M.(CCH) 1468 (1965); Communist Party v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.
862 (1962).
" See Communist Party v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1468, 1468 (1965). The Party
alleged that its failure to file tax returns was consistent with the standard practices of all
other political organizations, practices that the Service had not questioned in the past. See
Communist Party v. Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 332, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
See Communist Party v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1468, 1468 (1965).
3, Id. at 1468-69.
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for 1951, but also in income taxation in subsequent years-an out-
come that would have placed the party at a financial disadvantage
relative to other political parties-the Communist Party vigorously
contested the asserted deficiency.
In the Tax Court the party advanced arguments that: (1) the
Service had determined the deficiency in an arbitrary manner; and
(2) as a political organization, the Communist Party was exempt
from income taxation. 0 The Tax Court refused on procedural
grounds to consider the second argument4 and rejected the first
argument by holding that the Service's reliance on unexplained
bank credits to reconstruct taxable income was permissible. 2 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
overturned the Tax Court's determination. The court found the
government's method of arriving at taxable income inadequate and
remanded the case to enable "allowable deductions to be ascer-
tained with greater certainty. 4 3 The court also disagreed with the
Tax Court's holding that the issue of tax exemption had not been
duly raised. The court of appeals ordered reconsideration on re-
mand, noting with a trace of sarcasm:
[T]he Government now assures us that all political parties, includ-
ing petitioner, are taxable associations under the statute. That may
be, but the Tax Court did not so rule; and petitioner is entitled to
an adjudication in that court of its contention that the statute is not
to be so construed because the Commissioner and his predecessors
have never so construed it."
On remand, the government capitulated on virtually all of the
1' Id. at 1469-70.
11 The Tax Court essentially maintained that the Party had not duly raised the tax exemp-
tion issue. Id. at 1470.
42 Id. at 1469-70.
3 Communist Party v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The court of
appeals emphasized:
The total of these [bank] deposits is not, however, the same as the net income on
which the deficiency was found, and the record does not inform us as to how the
deficiency was computed. This latter figure comes from the examining agent's report,
which characterizes it only as reflecting "all bank credits" for 1951. The agent was
unable, without his work papers, to supply further details as a witness at the trial. He
said he had turned those papers over to a superior, but, when asked by petitioner to
produce them, the Government said that none were in existence.
Id. at 683.
" Id. at 684 (footnote omitted). The court recognized the significant stake that other
political parties had in the outcome of the case and suggested that these parties might appear
before the Tax Court on remand. Id. at 684 n.2.
[Vol. 65:513
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asserted tax liability. 5 The government's abrupt turnabout may
have been attributable to the Service's inability to establish with
any measurable certainty the deductions to which the Communist
Party was entitled. A more plausible explanation, however, is that
the Service realized that on remand the Tax Court would find a
history of nonenforcement-as the Communist Party had main-
tained. Subsequent events support this conclusion. Shortly after the
final disposition of Communist Party, the IRS issued Revenue Pro-
cedure 68-19,11 which stated publicly for the first time that recipi-
ents of political funds "may" file federal tax returns. 7 The cryptic,
tentative nature of this Revenue Procedure raised serious questions
about the Service's actual commitment to enforcement. 8 Arguably,
See H.R. REP. No. 1502, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1974).
" Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B. 810.
7 After confirming that "[p]olitical funds are not taxable to the political candidate by or
for whom they are collected if they are used for expenses of a political campaign or some
similar purpose," id., the revenue procedure warned:
Detailed substantiating records should be kept by the political candidate or other
custodian so as to enable the candidate to account accurately for the receipt and
disbursement of political funds .... Disbursements will be included in the income
of the political candidate in the absence of a showing that the funds were used for
campaign or similar purposes or repaid to known contributors.
Id. at 811. In a further statement that income from unexpended funds "may" be reported on
a Fiduciary Income Tax Return, the revenue procedure offered the first suggestion that such
income would be subject to income taxation. Id.
In contrast, the Service had stated in I.T. 3276, 1939-1 C.B. 108, that political gifts received
by individuals and political organizations were not taxable income. At that point the IRS
seemed to be concerned primarily with the manner in which property was received, rather
than with whether political organizations were tax exempt. Nearly 40 years later the Service
directed its field offices not to require political organizations to file income tax returns. See
Announcement 73-84, 1973-2 C.B. 461; TAx MNGM'T MEM. (BNA), Apr. 1, 1974, at 3. One
commentator has described this as a "somewhat astonishing step":
No published statement was ever made to the general public concerning this legisla-
tively unsanctioned tax exemption .... The surprising aspect of the field office direc-
tive was not that it recognized the lack of taxable income by political organizations
generally but that it granted a universal, unannounced, and legislatively unsanctioned
tax exemption to political organizations instead of merely having a case by case deter-
mination of whether any tax was due, as was true for other types of organizations.
Id. at 3.
Curiously, while the field offices were under orders not to require tax returns from political
entities, the Service issued several private rulings holding that political organizations should
file tax returns and that interest income earned on campaign funds was taxable. Having
announced neither position publicly, the IRS could argue both sides of the issue. See An-
nouncement 73-84, supra, at 461 (IRS policy statement acknowledging the inconsistency of
the two approaches). Despite the Service's dual policies, "apparently no political organiza-
tion ever felt compelled to file a tax return." TAx MNGM'T MEM., supra, at 3. See also R.
BOEHM, POLITICAL EXPENDruRES A-42 (BNA Tax Mngm't Portfolio No. 231, 1978).
" The IRS began to enforce Rev. Proc. 68-19 on a selective basis in 1972. In that year, the
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the Revenue Procedure was issued to lend some support-retro-
spectively-to the IRS stance in Communist Party and to offer at
least a modicum of administrative authority for future efforts in the
continuing struggle with the Communist Party. Ironically, this at-
tempt to tax a fringe political party would have far greater implica-
tions in the near future. By announcing publicly that political
parties might be taxed, the Service had made a dramatic shift in
its stated public policy-if not in its enforcement stance. Once an-
nounced, this policy change would be difficult to depart from in the
future and ultimately would snare the major political parties.
2. Congressional Manipulation of the Tax Laws
While the IRS was recognizing openly the possibility of taxing
political income, a fifteen-year debate over the use of the tax laws
to encourage more widespread political contributions was culminat-
ing in Congress. 9 Advocates of electoral reform, backed by an array
of respected political scientists and attorneys,10 for years had argued
that allowing taxpayers credits for contributions to political organi-
zations would induce greater participation in campaign finance,
diluting the immense power of a relatively few wealthy campaign
financiers. 51 Opponents of the credit proposals contended that the
real issue should be the desirability of opening the political process
to income taxation, with the attendant potential for taxpayer abuse
and IRS scrutiny. Particularly troublesome was what opponents
viewed as a constitutionally violative scheme for verifying that a
Service sent a letter to Congressman Frank Evans, citing the revenue procedure as authority
for collecting taxes on income earned on surplus campaign committee funds. In a 1973 letter
to Senator Gaylord Nelson, the Service stated that the "may" in Rev. Proc. 68-19 really
meant "shall." See 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 322, 330-31 (1973).
11 Academic and congressional proposals for tax incentives for political contributions were
first made in 1955. See Alexander, Financing the 1960 Election, in STUDIES IN MONEY IN
PoLmcs, Study Five at 29 (H. Alexander ed. 1965). For a history of the futile efforts to enact
a suitable measure, see Golden, supra note 2, at 224 n.26.
so See, e.g., Hearings on Campaign Contributions, Political Activities, and Lobbying
Before the Senate Special Comm. to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Cam-
paign Contributions, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., & 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1257 (1956-1957) (memo-
randum of Stanley Surrey); H. ALEXANDER, TAX INCENTIvES FOR POLmCAL CONTRmUTIONS 7
(1961); C. BANE, AmERIcAN Poimcs AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 499 (2d ed. 1955). Several com-
mentators recently have reiterated these views. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 193-94,
296-97; D. DUNN, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 148-49 (1972).
11 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS, FINANcING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 13-
16 (1962); Goldman, Income Tax Incentives for Political Contributors: A Study of the 1963
Proposals, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 212 (1964); Peters, Political Campaign Financing: Tax Incen-
tives for Small Contributors, 18 LA. L. REV. 414 (1958).
[Vol. 65:513
HeinOnline  -- 65 Va. L. Rev.  528 1979
1979] Taxation of Campaign Finance 529
contributor in fact had made a contribution of a certain amount to
a qualifying political organization. 52 Fears that IRS involvement in
the verification process could lead to identification of the political
affiliations of contributing taxpayers and inspection of the records
of donee political organizations stalled the legislation for sixteen
years. In 1971 Congress finally enacted a bill affording a maximum
$12.50 credit or $50 deduction to individual taxpayers . 3 The latter
provision is difficult to reconcile with the legislation's original pur-
pose of diluting the power of wealthy contributors. 54 During this
same time Congress established a check-off system permitting each
taxpayer to allocate one dollar of his taxes for use in Presidential
campaigns . 5 The Treasury was to accumulate all money collected
52 For discussion of proposals to solve the verification problem, see generally Goldman,
supra note 51, at 232-36; Peters, supra note 51, at 434-35.
0 Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 701, 85 Stat. 497 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 41, 642 (1976)). The Revenue Act of 1978 altered the deduction-credit alternative by
repealing the deduction and increasing the amount of the credit. See note 3 supra.
On identical contributions the deduction would benefit a taxpayer in the 50% bracket
twice as much as a taxpayer in the 25% bracket. A $50 maximum deduction would be unlikely
to attract more major contributors, however, because the tax benefits would be insignificant
in comparison with the magnitude of the contributions. In this sense, the legislation can be
characterized as progressive. See B. BrrTKER & L. STONE, supra note 6, at 315. If Congress
intended the deduction to encourage more middle income contributors to make moderate
contributions, the result seems to have been otherwise. See Adamany, supra note 5, at 3
(charging that the deduction-credit has failed to induce broader participation).
- Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 801, 85 Stat. 497 (codified at I.R.C.
§§ 9001-9013). The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809,
tit. Im, §§ 302-305, 80 Stat. 1587 (current version at I.R.C. § 6096), also had provided for a
one dollar check-off system, but the following year Congress barred distribution of the funds
until severe problems with the administration of the check-off system could be resolved. See
Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, § 5, 81 Stat. 57; D. ADAMANY, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN
AMERICA 259 (1972).
Intensive politicking surrounded the 1971 measure. The Republicans, in particular, saw the
provision as a transparent means of redressing the financial imbalance between the two major
parties. President Nixon threatened to veto any tax-cut measure to which the campaign
funding provisions were attached, unless the Democrats-who controlled Congress-agreed
to postpone the effective date of the check-off legislation until after the 1972 elections. The
Democrats assented in order to claim credit in the 1972 election for a tax cut. The Republi-
cans planned to continue fighting the check-off in Congress and the courts after the election.
See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., I DOLLAR POLmCS 57 (1973) [hereinafter cited as I DOL-
LAR POLrICS]. The provision therefore was made effective as of January 1, 1973, making it
unavailable until the 1976 Presidential election. S. REP. No. 553, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 58
(1971).
Initially, the post-election fight was waged in an administrative forum. The IRS published
a separate check-off tax form for 1973, which resulted in minimal taxpayer participation.
Only after a considerable outcry from Congress and public interest groups did the Service
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in a special fund, allocating it among major and minor political
parties according to a predetermined statutory formula.56
The changes taking place in political campaigning provide the
best explanation for the flurry of congressional activity that resulted
in the check-off and deduction-credit statutes. Because electronic
media had become the dominant campaign tool, staging a success-
ful campaign now required vast sums of money. Traditionally, can-
didates had emphasized organization and loyal party workers. If
elected, a candidate typically paid off his campaign debts through
patronage. Financing, although important in the past, was now cru-
cial to a campaign that required television and radio time, sophisti-
cated advertising spots, scientific polling, and professional cam-
paign organizers. This new style of campaigning mandated a dra-
matic increase in campaign funding.57
Congressional activity in 1971 was not ascribable exclusively,
however, to the revolution in political campaign techniques and the
agree to place the check-off option directly on Form 1040. See I DoLLAR PoLrcs, supra, at
57. The entire statutory scheme was questioned in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-109 (1976).
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, rejecting first and fifth amendment challenges.
5' The money must be distributed according to an established list of priorities. First, a
portion of the fund must be allocated to pay for Presidential nominating conventions. I.R.C.
§ 9008(a). See note 34 supra. Funds are allocated next to candidates of qualifying parties
according to a statutory formula. I.R.C. § 9004. Any remaining money may be allocated to
candidates seeking party nominations. I.R.C. §§ 9031-9042. '
I See Hearings on H.R. 8627, H.R. 8678 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Power
and Communication of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 65 (1971) (statement of Congressman John Murphy). In 1968 the Nixon campaign
ranked as the 79th largest television advertiser, between Schlitz Brewing and Monsanto. The
Humphrey campaign's expenditures placed it at 109th, between Sperry Rand and Standard
Oil of New Jersey. Id.
The cost of campaigning for all offices rose from $200 million in 1964 to $300 million four
years later, with the expanded use of modem advertising technology accounting for a vast
portion of the increase. See Rosenbloom, Background Paper, in TWENTimTH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON FINANCING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS, ELECTING CONGRESS (1970); Comment,
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Reform of the Political Process?, 60 GEO. L.J.
1309, 1309 & n.2, 1315 n.32 (1972). See generally TwENTmH CENTURY FUND, VOTERS TIME
(1969). In 1971 Congress attempted to control media expenditures by passing the Campaign
Communications Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. I, § 104, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976)). The ceiling, however, was not particularly low and easily could be
circumvented. See Comment, supra, at 1315-16, 1319.
By 1972 total expenditures for all campaigns had climbed to $425 million, H. ALEXANDER,
supra note 1, at 77, and estimates for 1976 calculated total spending at well over $500
million-increases greatly exceeding the inflation rate. See I DOLLAR POLITrCS, supra note 55,
at 2-5, 11-14; D. ADAMANY, supra note 55, at 58-63. While the media continues to be a vital
and costly aspect of political campaigning, doubts exist regarding its effectiveness and the
extent to which it will be relied upon in the future. See, e.g., D. ADAmANY & G. AGREE, supra
note 1, at 76; I DOLLAR PoLrrcs, supra note 55, at 12-13.
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concomitant need for greater campaign finance. The Democratic
Party's acute need for financing was an important additional con-
sideration. Although the Democratic Party controlled Congress, it
faced a well-heeled Republican Party and an incumbent President. :
Manipulation of the tax laws could redress the long-term financial
imbalance between the parties. At a time when a candidate's
chances of winning an election seemed to be directly proportional
to the amount of money spent on his campaign, a powerful incentive
existed to put aside hypothetical concerns over the potential for IRS
involvement in the political process.
The new legislation, following so closely the Service's own tenta-
tive steps away from a policy of de facto tax exemption, represented
more than an attempt to augment campaign contributions by in-
creasing participation. Both the deduction-credit and the check-off
measures revealed Congress's self-serving willingness to tolerate
some role, albeit a vague one, for taxation in the political realm.
3. Active IRS Enforcement Commences
In Revenue Procedure 68-19 the IRS had recognized formally for
the first time the possibility of taxing the income of political organi-
zations. At least a decade earlier, however, the Service had estab-
lished a firm enforcement posture regarding the gift tax liability of
contributors. 9 The gift tax represented a less sensitive issue be-
cause, unlike administration of the income tax law, enforcement of
the gift tax entailed IRS involvement only with contributors and not
with the donee organizations. Moreover, in light of the annual exclu-
sion of $3,000 per donee,10 and the $30,000 lifetime exemption per
donor,"1 the tax placed a relatively insignificant burden on most
contributors.
Not long after Congress enacted the deduction-credit and check-
off legislation, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered
" Although attempts to activate the check-off system for the 1972 elections faltered, the
measure promised to palliate the Democratic Party's chronic financial difficulties in future
Presidential campaigns. The party's financial straits had been painfully obvious in the pre-
vious Presidential election when in October of 1968, with less than one month before the
election, Humphrey's campaign essentially had exhausted its funds. See Alexander &
Meyers, A Financial Landslide for the G.O.P., FORTUNE, Mar. 1970, at 104, 187.
" But see note 12 supra.
"I.R.C. § 2503(b).
SInt. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2521, 68A Stat. 410 (repealed 1976) (effective for gifts
made prior to Jan. 1, 1977). For post-1976 gifts, a credit is available that will reach $47,000
by 1981. I.R.C. § 2505(a)-(b).
1979]
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a case 2 directly challenging the Service's authority to collect gift tax
on political contributions. 3 In Stern v. United States" the plaintiff
and several other taxpayers had contributed substantial sums of
money to a committee that they had formed to disburse funds to
reform candidates in Louisiana. Mrs. Stern stated that she had
made the contributions to promote the election of candidates who
would protect her investments by altering Louisiana's economic and
tax structures. 5 The IRS, following its long-standing policy concern-
ing the gift tax liability of contributors, sought to collect the tax.
Mrs. Stem argued that no gift tax was due because she had made
her contribution in the ordinary course of business to protect her
investments. Affirming the decision of the district court, the court
of appeals held for Mrs. Stern and emphasized that:
In a very real sense, then, Mrs. Stern was making an economic
investment that she believed would have a direct and favorable
effect upon her property holdings and business interests in New
Orleans and Louisiana. These factors, in conjunction with the un-
disputed findings of the lower court that the expenditures were bona
fide, at arms length and free from donative intent, lead us, in light
of what we have said above, to the conclusion that the expenditures
satisfy the spirit of the Regulations and are to be considered as made
for an adequate and full consideration.66
The potential impact of the Stern decision on campaign finance
cannot be overestimated. The Stern rationale, coupled with the de
facto income tax exemption of political organizations, presented the
possibility of insulating the entire political process from all forms
of taxation. When a contributor transferred property to a political
organization, and that entity earned income on the contribution,
neither would be required to pay any gift or income taxes, or to
comply with any reporting requirements. Although the contributor
62 Stem v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971).
'9 One other court had addressed the issue of gift taxation of political contributions, but
in a different factual context. In Du Pont v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 944 (D. Del. 1951),
the court held that Lammot Du Pont's $6,000 contribution to the National Economic Council,
an organization advocating free enterprise, was subject to gift taxation. Du Pont argued that
he had made a payment to the Council for services that it would perform by fostering a
national economic climate favorable to his investments. The court rejected this contention,
stressing that the payments were not ordinary and necessary business expenses and that no
identifiable consideration had been received. In this sense, the court likened Du Pont to a
contributor who gives money to a political party sharing his economic viewpoint. Id. at 947.
64 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971).
,5 Id. at 1328-29.
, Id. at 1330 (footnote omitted).
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would have to establish a bona fide business purpose for the trans-
fer, this would not present serious difficulties in many cases. 7 Not
surprisingly, the IRS strongly opposed the Stern decision and re-
fused to follow it in any other circuit. 8
As the 1972 Presidential campaign accelerated, IRS opposition to
the Stern decision69 meant that several major contributors, includ-
ing Chicago insurance multimillionaire W. Clement Stone,70 faced
the prospect of substantial gift tax liability. These contributors cir-
cumvented the gift tax by using a rather crude technique: the estab-
lishment of thousands of paper political committees. A sole con-
tributor would make a contribution not exceeding $3,000 to each
of the paper committees. Each distinct contributor fell within the
gift tax exclusion for transfers to any one donee in a calendar year.71
11 The court's reliance on bona fide business purpose, although rooted in the Internal
Revenue Code, rested primarily on the regulations. I.R.C. § 2501 (a)(1) imposes the gift tax
on "the transfer of property by gift." The Code, however, does not define "gift," leaving this
process to the Service and the courts. I.R.C. § 2512(b) does provide that "[wihere property
is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth,
then the [difference] shall be deemed a gift. . . ." Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958) amplifies
this definition, stating that "a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made in the
ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from
any donative intent), will be considered as made for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth." Mrs. Stem's contribution does not appear to be a transaction
"made in the ordinary course of business" under the usual meaning of these terms. The
Supreme Court, however, has opposed such a restrictive reading in special circumstances.
See, e.g., Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950) (marital transfer pursuant to property
settlement, although not fitting conventional notions of being "in the ordinary course of
business," qualifies for exemption from gift tax).
" Rev. Rul. 72-583, 1972-2 C.B. 534. Moreover, the Service stated that even in the Fifth
Circuit the decision would be followed only in cases "on all-fours" with Stern. Id. Accordingly,
commentators urged contributors to pursue other means of reducing their gift tax liability.
See, e.g., Cohen, Recent case indicates some political gifts may not be subject to the gift tax,
36 J. TAx. 146, 147 (1972). In June of 1973 legislation to remove political contributions from
the definition of "gift" for gift tax purposes was introduced in Congress, but died in the
Senate Finance Committee. S.2065, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (gifts made to political com-
mittees will be deemed gifts to the candidate, with a limited exception).
" At least one commentator has suggested that the Service's opposition to Stern stimulated
contributor interest in finding techniques to avoid gift tax. See 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 322, 325
(1973). See generally 46 TUL. L. REv. 344 (1971); 40 U. Cm. L. Rev. 381 (1971).
11 For an account of Stone's and other significant contributors' efforts to avoid paying gift
tax on political contributions, see note 71 infra. Mrs. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., in contrast,
contributed $1,482,625 through a single committee to Nelson Rockefeller's campaign in 1968,
resulting in a gift tax liability of $854,483. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 359.
1' Stone contributed over $2 million, writing 700 checks for $3,000 each to separate Nixon
campaign finance committees. See Rogovin, supra note 8, at 18. Mellon heir Richard Scaife
acknowledged that he had contributed $990,000 by making payments of $3,000 to each of 330
separate committees. Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 5. One estimate calculated
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Although this practice was widely regarded as a transparent device
for avoiding taxes, contributors sought an IRS ruling approving the
technique. To the astonishment of many, the IRS responded with
Revenue Ruling 72-355, which held that each recipient committee
was a separate donee for tax purposes, even though all were mere
conduits to the Republican National Committee and all were con-
trolled by interlocking directorates.72
The ruling produced a result totally at odds with the Service's
defense of the gift tax following the Stern decision, intimating that
external pressures had influenced the IRS decision. Tax Analysts
and Advocates, one of many public interest groups to criticize
the ruling, brought suit to enjoin the IRS from adhering to the
decision. 73 In a second action, Ralph Nader sought to compel a
Scaife's gift tax savings at between $244,000 and $590,000. Mintz, Politics, Gifts, and Taxes,
Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1972, § C, at 1, col. 7, 10, col. 1. Democrats as well as Republicans
evaded the gift tax: McGovern campaign workers admitted establishing several hundred
committees exclusively to receive contributions in $3,000 installments. Landauer, How Politi-
cal Donors Avoid Gift, Gains Taxes by Contributing Stock, Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1972, at 1,
col. 6.
Paper committees were used effectively for gifts of appreciated property as well as for cash
contributions. Republican financiers sent out form letters reading in part:
I am delivering this stock to you as my agent to effect transfer thereof as herein set
forth. . . . You are authorized and directed to divide this stock into certificates with
values of not [sic] to exceed $3,000 each, on the date of transfer, and to cause one of
the certificates, as my agent for such purpose, to be transferred to each of the following
separate entities.
Spaces for listing the paper committees appeared below this statement, and each contributor
received a list of 50 committees from which to choose his donees. Landauer, supra, at 24,
col. 4.
22 Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532. The ruling stated further that:
Where, however, political organizations have essentially the same officers and sup-
ported candidates and no substantial independent purpose, the organizations will be
treated as one and gifts to them by an individual will be aggregated for purposes of
section 2503(b) of the Code. For purposes of this paragraph, the officers or supported
candidates will not be deemed to be essentially the same if at least one-third of the
officers or candidates are different in each of the committees.
Id. The requirement that one-third of the membership vary from committee to committee
was easily satisfied; the ruling elevated form over substance. See Feinschreiber & Granwell,
Avoiding the Gift Tax on Political Contributions: Obstacles and Opportunities, 50 TAxES 671,
682 (1972) (six officers and six candidates could be arranged to form 2,209 separate commit-
tees to which $6,627,000 per year could be contributed without any gift tax liability).
" Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974). The district court
ruled against the government, resting the decision on Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393
(1941), in which the Supreme Court had held that the beneficiaries of a trust, not the trust
itself, were donees for purposes of the annual exclusion. To avoid extended litigation, the
Service conceded that Rev. Rul. 72-355 was no longer good authority. T.I.R. 1325, Dec. 29,
1974. On appeal, the Tax Analysts & Advocates decision ultimately was vacated and
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recalcitrant IRS to disclose, pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act, alleged communications between IRS officials and the White
House concerning the Service's policy on multiple gift committees.7 1
Subsequent disclosures confirmed that the executive branch had
pressured the IRS and that the office of the Chief Counsel of the
Treasury-in a departure from normal procedure-had drafted the
ruling.75
These revelations raised sEious questions regarding the integrity
of the IRS and thus threatened the effective functioning of the tax
system. Within weeks, the IRS publicly sought to recoup its prestige
by shifting to Congress the burden of immediately enacting a com-
prehensive scheme for taxation of campaign finance. In April of
1973, the Secretary of the Treasury, testifying before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, pleaded for a legislative solution
that would "minimize the involvement of the Internal Revenue
Service in the affairs of the political system. ' 7
At the height of Watergate and in anticipation of the 1974 elec-
tions, the IRS not only challenged Congress to act, but also took
steps of its own to rehabilitate its tarnished enforcement image. In
late 1973 and early 1974, the Service issued a series of rulings setting
forth the following principles: (1) all political organizations would
be required to file tax returns; 7" (2) political organizations would be
regarded as taxable associations, 78 and campaign funds adminis-
tered by or for candidates would be treated as trusts taxable on all
investment income; 79 (3) gifts of appreciated property would be
remanded for dismissal of the complaint as moot. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon,
75-1 USTC 13,052 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1975). The court of appeals ordered the remand
because in the interim Congress had passed a law exempting political contributions from
federal gift taxation. See notes 105-11 infra and accompanying text.
11 Nader v. I.R.S., Civil No. 1851-72 (D.D.C., filed May 18, 1973). After nearly a year of
legal maneuvering, the Service finally released IRS and Treasury records. See 23 CATH. U.L.
Rzv. 322, 326 n.26 (1973).
11 See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 360. Commenting on the procedures employed,
Congressman Henry Reuss suggested an "'apparent combination in restraint of tax col-
lection.'" See 23 CATm. U.L. REv. 322, 326 n.26, 327 n.27 (1973) (quoting Press Release issued
by Congressman Reuss, June 9, 1973, at 3).
11 Public Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on General Tax Reform
(pt. 18), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6873, 6889-89 (1973) (statement of Secretary of the Treasury
George P. Shultz).
n Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14, 16.
7"Id.
1, Rev. Rul. 74-23, 1974-1 C.B. 17, 18. In Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14, 15, the Service
had concluded that a particular campaign group most closely resembled a corporation, be-
cause the organization had associates, carried on activities furthering the goals for which it
1979]
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taxable to the donee organization; 80 and (4) contributions that con-
gressmen receive for newsletter funds would be includable in their
gross income.81 These policies, if literally enforced, posed a major
threat to the system of de facto tax exemption of political organiza-
tions that had persisted largely intact for sixty years.
II. THE STATUTORY SYSTEM OF TAX EXEMPTION
Congress reacted quickly to the prospect of campaign finance
taxation, passing without public comment or congressional debate
legislation that addressed each of the positions endorsed by the
Service in its rulings. Despite the Senate Finance Committee's rec-
ognition that this legislation involved questions concerning the
"delicate balance between the need to protect the revenue and of
[sic] the need to encourage political activities which are the heart
of the democratic process, 8 2 the legislation went no further in re-
solving the question of taxation's proper role in the political process.
A. The Legislative History of the New Law
Congress's initial attempt to enact a statutory tax exemption for
the political process lay buried in the Energy Tax and Individual
Relief Act of 1974, 81 which was reported by the House Committee
on Ways and Means on November 26, 1974.84 Because of maneuver-
ing on unrelated provisions, the legislation did not reach the House
floor.85 The Senate Finance Committee, however, soon included
had been created, granted its officers continuous exclusive authority to make management
decisions, and possessed an identity unaffected by changes in personnel. In contrast, Rev.
Rul. 74-23 required the individual candidate to file a Fiduciary Income Tax Return because
his campaign funds remained under his control and not within the power of a separate
organization.
" Rev. Rul. 74-23, 1974-1 C.B. 17, 18; Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14, 16. The Service
founded its position on the notion that the transfer of appreciated property does not trigger
realization of income. Gain would be realized only when the donee disposed of the property
in a taxable sale or exchange. The donee, like any donee of gift property, would take the
contributor's basis. I.R.C. § 1015.
" Rev. Rul. 73-356, 1973-2 C.B. 31, 32. The Service thus differentiated between newsletter
funds and direct contributions, which were characterized as gifts.
S. REP. No. 1357, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7478, 7502.
H.R. 17488, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
H.R. REP. No. 1502, supra note 45.
" Senator Russell Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, explained that the
bill died in the House before hearings were held because a number of Congressmen felt that
the bill taxed the oil industry too lightly. 120 CONG. REc. 40348 (1974). The Wall Street
Journal offered a different explanation: Congressmen from oil-producing states had voted the
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essentially the same provisions in the Upholstery Regulators Act of
1974,86 which otherwise concerned the suspension of customs duties
on upholstery needles. This "Christmas Tree" bill 7 was reported
out of committee on December 16 without hearings.8 The bill was
reported favorably by House and Senate Conferences on December
1911 and was passed in both Houses on December 20, with virtually
no floor debate. 0 Several Congressmen objected vehemently be-
cause copies of the final bill apparently were not made available to
them before the vote." Despite these objections and the bill's rather
obscure legislative history, President Ford signed the provisions into
law on January 3, 1975.92
B. The Five Critical Elements of the New Law
The enactment of the campaign finance provisions of the Uphol-
stery Regulators Act represented a legislative counterattack against
threatened IRS enforcement of the tax laws in the political arena.
The report of the Senate Finance Committee recognized that the
Act would "[modify] the tax treatment of political organizations
in five major respects": 3 (1) exempting political parties from taxa-
tion, (2) eliminating gift tax liability, (3) increasing the credit and
deduction for contributors, (4) exempting newsletter funds, and
bill down, presumably because it would have increased oil producers' taxes substantially.
Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1974, at 8, col. 2.
" Upholstery Regulators Act, Pub. L. No. 93-625, 88 Stat. 2108 (1975)(current versions at
scattered sections of I.R.C.). With the exception of a few differences in phrasing, these
provisions were identical to those originally proposed in the House. Compare H.R. 17488, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 271-274 (1974), as reported by the House Committee on Ways and Means
in H.R. Rap. No. 1502, supra note 45, at 103-13, with Upholstery Regulators Act, Pub. L. No.
93-625, §§ 10-14, 88 Stat. 2108 (1975) (current versions at scattered sections of I.R.C.).
" Congressman William Steiger, in particular, pressed Chairman Ullman as to whether the
"pins and needles" bill had in fact become a "Christmas Tree" bill. 120 CONG. Rxc. 41815
(1974). The bill also included provisions dealing with accrued vacation pay, real estate invest-
ment trusts, and interest charges on late tax payments. Upholstery Regulators Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-625, §§ 4, 6-7, 88 Stat. 2108 (1974) (current versions at scattered sections of I.R.C.).
In retrospect, Steiger's concern seems well-founded, considering the significant tax legislation
that Congress enacted after only the most cursory study.
H.R. 421, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 10-14 (1974), as reported by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee in S. RaP. No. 1357, supra note 82, at 25-36.
" H.R. REP. No. 1642, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
" 120 CONG. REc. 41659, 41822 (1974). See generally Golden, supra note 2, at 224-25.
"1 120 CoNG. REc. 41821 (1974).
" Upholstery Regulators Act, Pub. L. No. 93-625, §§ 10-14, 88 Stat. 2108 (1975)(current
versions at scattered sections of I.R.C.).
93 S. RaP. No. 1357, supra note 82, at 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws
7478, 7481.
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(5) taxing contributions of appreciated property.
In the Upholstery Regulators Act, Congress finally and formally
exempted from income taxation the contributions received by polit-
ical organizations." Congress did provide, however, that political
organizations would be subject to tax on investment income, as if
they were corporations.15 Previously, the Service, in laying out its
new policy in the early 1974 rulings,96 had indicated that although
political organizations would be taxed on investment income, they
would not be taxed on campaign contributions." Although similar
to the stance ultimately adopted by Congress, the Service's position
had some troublesome aspects. First, in ruling on the exemption of
contributions, the IRS emphasized that political organizations gen-
erally are not exempt from taxation. In the Upholstery Regulators
" I.R.C. § 527(a).
I.R.C. § 527(b) provides for the income taxation of "political organization taxable in-
come." Political organization taxable income is defined as the gross income of the organiza-
tion (excluding "exempt function income") less related deductions. Id. § 527(c)(1). Exempt
function income is any amount received as:
(A) a contribution of money or other property,
(B) membership dues, a membership fee or assessment from a member of the
political organization, or
(C) proceeds from a political fundraising or entertainment event, or proceeds
from the sale of political campaign materials, which are not received in the ordinary
course of any trade or business,
to the extent such amount is segregated for use only for the exempt function of the
political organization.
Id. § 527(c)(3).
I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) defines "exempt function" as:
the function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, elec-
tion, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or
office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential
electors, whether or not such individual or electors are selected, nominated, elected,
or appointed.
The statute seems to contemplate a two-part test: to qualify for tax exemption, funds must
fall within certain categories of receipts and be expended for political purposes. Thus, both
investment income and interest income would fail the initial test and would be taxed even if
expended for political purposes. The tax would be imposed at corporate rates, but without
the benefit of the surtax exemption. Id. § 527(b)(1). Curiously, the statute proposes a
harsher rule than the IRS had adopted in Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B. 810. In that ruling
the Service indicated that interest earned on unexpended campaign funds would be taxable,
implying that interest on previously accrued income spent on the campaign would not be
taxed.
U See notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
'7 Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14, 16. The IRS offered no rationale for this determination.
Presumably, the Service found that contributions are made out of "detached and disinter-
ested generosity," although this scarcely could be the case in every instance. See note 7 supra.
Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14, 15:
An organization that is organized and operated exclusively to engage in activities the
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Act Congress rejected this IRS position and established that "a
political organization shall be considered an organization exempt
from income taxes."99 By enacting a statutory tax exemption for
political organizations, Congress finally had reversed the Service
and, at least superficially, 1 closed an avenue for IRS involvement
in campaign finance.
Second, the Service's ruling exempted campaign contributions
from taxation on the ground that the contributions constituted gifts.
The IRS, however, carefully ignored other sources of funding, leav:
ing open the possibility of taxing other types of receipts. The legisla-
tion expressly brought not only contributions, but also proceeds
from political fundraising and entertainment events, receipts from
sales of political campaign materials, and membership dues, fees,
and assessments within the exemption.' 0' In light of the increasingly
critical role these other items play in campaign finance, the differ-
ences in the scope of the congressional and IRS tax exemptions is
significant. Congress took a further step by defining the term
"contributions" to include "a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or
deposit, of money, or anything of value, [as well as] a contract,
promise, or agreement to make a contribution, whether or not le-
gally enforceable."102 This definition far exceeded the ordinary con-
notation of the term and set forth a broader meaning than the IRS
was likely to adopt on its own.
Finally, the legislation extended the treatment accorded political
organizations to the segregated campaign funds of individual candi-
dates.' 03 This provision eliminated the differential treatment, at-
tendant confusion, and potential rateshopping introduced by the
Service's attempt to tax political organizations as corporations
while taxing candidates' campaign funds as trusts. '"4
purpose of which is to influence the nomination or election of individuals to public
office is not one of the organizations that may be exempt from the Federal income tax
for purposes described in section 501. Nor is such an organization one covered by any
other provision of the Code as exempt from the Federal income tax. There is no judicial
decision holding that such an organization is exempt from such tax.
I.R.C. § 527(a).
,N IRS activity was only superficially precluded because the institution of a statutory
scheme of exemption presages IRS involvement in enforcement, especially when the statute
is drafted so ambiguously. See notes 130-52 and accompanying text.
' I.R.C. § 527(c)(3). See note 95 supra.
'n I.R.C. § 271(b)(2) (incorporated in § 527(e)(3)).
'' See id. § 527(e)(1),(f)(3).
I" See notes 9, 78 & 79 supra and accompanying text.
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In addition to granting income tax exemption to political organi-
zations, Congress exempted contributors from gift tax liability. Fol-
lowing Stern, the IRS steadfastly had adhered to the position that
all political contributions were subject to gift taxation' 5 Congress
expressly rejected this rationale, emphasizing that "it is inappro-
priate to apply the gift tax to political contributions because the tax
system should not be used to reduce or restrict political contribu-
tions.",",
In the gift tax provision, Congress specifically exempted-without
exceptions or qualifications-the transfer of property to a political
organization. 0 7 The law thus went considerably beyond the Stern
rationale, which was limited to contributions for which there was a
demonstrable, bona fide business purpose.' 8 Moreover, the new law
effectively resolved the issue raised in the Tax Analysts & Advo-
cates"' case: with the enactment of the blanket gift tax exemption,
1* See notes 59-68 supra and accompanying text. Despite the established position of the
Service, one commentator has stated that "[p]olitical contributions have played a somewhat
shadowy role on the gift tax scene. The popular conception seems to be that they are not really
gifts subject to tax and it has been widely speculated that substantial contributions are never
reported for gift tax purposes." Faber, Gift Tax Planning: The New Valuation Tables; Net
Gifts; Political Gifts; and other Problems, in NEW YORK UNsvEsrrY THnurY-FrasT INsTrruTE
oN FEDE_..L TAXATmON 1217, 1244 (1973). Another commentator has speculated that compli-
ance probably was "negligible" even before Stem. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 347. To the extent
that these assessments are accurate, taxpayer behavior regarding the gift tax essentially
paralleled political organizations' conduct regarding the income tax. See note 47 supra.
10 H.R. REP. No. 1502, supra note 45, at 110. Congress articulated no further explanation.
On the floor of the House, Chairman Ullman remarked that "campaign contributions in
reality are not a gift but rather constitute contributions to further the general political or good
government objectives of the donor." 120 CONG. REc. 41818 (1974). Several commentators
have offered a different justification for a gift tax exemption. The primary purposes of the
gift tax are to complement the estate tax, to prevent avoidance of estate tax by lifetime gifts,
and to deter income-splitting among family members. See Faber, supra note 105, at 1263-64;
Lehrfeld, The Gift Tax Implications of Political Contributions, 54 A.B.A.J. 1032 (1968);
Streng, supra note 2, at 174. But see Schoenblum, supra note 12, at 653-55.
"I I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5) provides that the tax otherwise imposed by I.R.C. § 2501 (a)(1) on
the transfer of property by gift "shall not apply to the transfer of money or other property to
a political organization (within the meaning of section 527(e)(1)) for the use of such organiza-
tion." The implication is, however, that political contributions are gifts. The provision is
effective with regard to transfers made after May 7, 1974, but it fails to specify the proper
tax treatment of contributions made prior to that date. The Tax Court's recent decision in
Carson v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 252 (1978), indicates that these previous contributions will
not be classified as gifts for gift tax purposes. Moreover, to the extent that Carson is applied
to transfers made after May 7, 1974, it could undermine the statutory scheme. Because
Carson was not a majority decision, however, the case's precedential value remains uncertain.
"I Several commentators have viewed the Stem case as factually unique and of little
precedential value for the vast majority of political contribution cases. See Faber, surpa note
105, at 1245-58; Streng, supra note 2, at 173. But see note 67 supra and accompanying text.
" Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974).
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a multitude of paper committees was no longer needed to maximize
the number of $3,000 inclusions."10
The principal beneficiaries of the gift tax provision, other than the
donee organizations, were contributors who were in a position to
make contributions exceeding $3,000 per organization or candi-
date-scarcely the individuals Congress ostensibly sought to bring
into the political system through tax incentives. Moreover, the legis-
lation appeared to be inconsistent with Congress's purported effort
to dilute the power of the small group of wealthy contributors. Be-
hind a smokescreen of populist rhetoric, Congress was reshaping the
tax system to attract even greater funding from those with the most
money to contribute. 1 '
The Upholstery Regulators Act doubled the maximum income tax
credit and deduction for political contributions, 2 exemplifying
"I The enactment of this legislation effectively mooted the Tax Analysts &Advocates case.
See note 73 supra. The district court opinion, in fact, may have been one of the major
incentives for the legislation. Enjoining the Service from enforcing its multiple committees
ruling, the district court stated that "political contributions are subject to the gift tax." Tax
Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 899 (D.D.C. 1974) (emphasis in original).
The court also appeared to endorse the Service's attempt to limit the application of Stern.
See id. at 899 n.33.
"I Curiously, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1)-(3)), just two
months prior to the Upholstery Regulators Act. These amendments limited contributions
to an individual candidate's committee to $1,000 per primary, run-off, and general election,
and set a $5,000 ceiling on contributions by an independent political committee. Further-
more, these amendments set $25,000 as the maximum amount that an individual could
contribute in any election year. Id.
At first glance, these contribution limitations appear to defeat the purpose of the gift tax
exemption. For several reasons, however, the gift tax exemption was not meaningless. First,
substantial doubts existed regarding the constitutionality of the contribution limits. The
Supreme Court did hold a number of the contribution restrictions unconstitutional in Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), but upheld the general framework. Second, contributors had
no reason to assume that contribution limits would be enforced more seriously than they had
been in the past, especially when congressional leaders were to choose the members of the
enforcing agency, the Federal Election Commission. The Supreme Court later declared the
Federal Election Commission unconstitutional as composed, id. at 140, and the Commission
has since been restructured. Third, the limits on campaign contributions were indexed for
inflation, ensuring that the ceilings would rise in inflationary periods. Given an inflationary
trend, the gift tax exemption would gain significance over time. Fourth, contributors were
permitted to give more than $3,000 to multicandidate and party committees, contributions
for which the annual $3,000 exclusion would be inadequate. Finally, these federal contribu-
tion limits did not govern contributions to state and local candidates and their committees.
2 Upholstery Regulators Act, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 12 (a)-(b), 88 Stat. 2108 (1975) (codi-
fied at I.R.C. §§ 41(b)(1), 218(b)(1)). The credit ceiling was raised from $12.50 to $25.00
($50.00 in the case of a joint return). I.R.C. § 41(a)-(b). The provision that a credit could be
claimed for no more than one-half of the taxpayer's total contributions, regardless of the type
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Congress's preoccupation with stimulating campaign finance, even
at the price of sacrificing broader participation. Previously, a con-
tributor could claim a credit or deduction only for contributions
made in the year that the candidate formally announced his inten-
tion to run for office."' The new law permitted the contributor to
take the credit or deduction for contributions to an undeclared
candidate, provided the donee announced his candidancy by the
subsequent year."' By increasing the number of years in which
credits and deductions would be available, Congress encouraged
an increase in total contributions. More important, Congress gave
its members and other incumbents a financial advantage: an in-
cumbent is well-known prior to a formal announcement of his candi-
dacy and is likely to have an organization to solicit, receive, and
manage funds before an opponent has even come forward. 1 5
The provisions that Congress enacted governing newsletter funds
also reflect reliance on the tax system both to encourage campaign
finance and to strengthen the relative positions of incumbents.
Elected officials traditionally had published newsletters to inform
constituents about their positions on a variety of issues. Newslet-
ters long had been recognized, however, as playing more than an
informational role. Professional politicians regarded the newsletter
as an effective political tool for maintaining visibility with the elec-
torate and projecting a positive public image. " '
of return, was retained. Id. § 41(a). The maximum amount deductible was increased from
$50 to $100 ($200 in the case of a joint return). Upholstery Regulators Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
625, §§ 11(d), 12(b), 88 Stat. 2108 (1975) (repealed 1978).
13 Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 701(a), 85 Stat. 497 (amended by Up-
holstery Regulators Act, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 11(e), 88 Stat. 2108 (1975)) (current version
at I.R.C. § 41 (c)(2)(A)).
"I More precisely, the statute authorizes a credit for political contributions to a candidate,
defining "candidate" to include one who "publicly announces before the close of the calendar
year following the calendar year in which the contribution or gift is made that he is a
candidate." I.R.C. § 41(c)(2)(A).
"I As one commentator has pointed out, a bias in favor of the major national political
parties also exists in the current statutory provisions. See Golden, supra note 2, at 230-32.
Contributions may be made even in nonelection years to the national committees of parties
that placed candidates or electors for President and Vice President on the official election
ballot of at least ten states in the previous election. I.R.C. § 41(c)(1)(C), (c)(3).
16 Congressman John Anderson, chairman of the House Republican Conference, has de-
scribed the newsletter, for which Congress currently has allocated funds to its members, as
one of the "perquisites of office that make it very difficult for challengers." AMERICAN ENTER-
PRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, FORUM 3, REGULATION OF POLITICAL CAM-
PAIGNS-How SUCCESSFUL? 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as REGULATION OF POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNS].
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In late 1973, the Service took the position in Revenue Ruling 73-
356 that payments received by an elected official to fund publica-
tion of a newsletter were includable in the gross income of the offi-
cial."7 Although the IRS would permit the official to offset this
income by taking deductions for publication expenses, significant
accounting problems could arise concerning whether the deductions
could be claimed in the same year in which the income would have
to be reported."' Moreover, officials claiming the standard deduc-
tion would lose the benefit of the publication deductions entirely.
Under this ruling officials would have had to maintain detailed
records that would be subject to IRS review. Ostensibly to alleviate
these difficulties, Congress classified newsletter funds as tax-
exempt political organizations,"' thus eliminating the inclusion of
funds typically received for newsletters in candidates' gross income.
Congress went further, however, taking this opportunity to classify
such payments as contributions that qualified for the increased
credit and deduction for political contributions.' 0 Like the
deduction-credit amendment, the provision also afforded a special
dispensation to incumbents.' 2'
,,7 Rev. Rul. 73-356, 1973-2 C.B. 31, 32. This treatment applied even if the funds were
segregated and unreachable for campaign purposes. Although the Service did not provide a
satisfactory rationale for this position, presumably it viewed such funds as available for the
candidate's personal use and thus includable in his income. See note 10 supra.
"I Streng, supra note 2, at 163-64 & n.138. For a discussion of other potential problems,
see H.R. RE. No. 1502, supra note 45, at 111.
' I.R.C. § 527(g).
' Id. § 41(a). Congress offered no satisfactory rationale for this step. The Senate Finance
Committee explained rather disingenuously that "the governmental process is strengthened
by encouraging such contributions. It is vital that citizens know what their elected public
officials are doing in office, so the voters can evaluate their performance for future elections
and can tell their officials what they want them to do and not to do." S. REP. No. 1357,
supra note 82, at 35, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7478, 7511. Of
course, newsletters doubtlessly presented biased assessments of the official's performance.
See note 116 supra. Moreover, Congressmen and other elected officials already enjoyed exten-
sive franking and stationery allowances. The franking privilege allows members of Congress
to send mail under their signatures without being charged for postage. In 1976 members sent
421.4 million pieces of franked mail, at a cost of $51.8 million to taxpayers. The House passed
a bill in 1977 that would place some restrictions on Congressmen's franking privileges. See
H.R. 7792, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 35 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1446 (1977). The Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee amended the bill to increase Senate franking privileges,
which traditionally have been narrower than House privileges. 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
2698, 2698-99 (1978). See also REGULATION OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, supra note 116, at 6
(comments of Prof. Ralph Winter alleging that the frank "costs more than challengers spend
on an entire election-year campaign").
2I Theoretically, the newsletter fund tax benefits also are available to candidates for elec-
tion to public office. See I.R.C. §§ 41(a), 41(c)(5), 527(g). The benefit, however, goes to
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Prior to the 1974 legislation contributors in many cases had pre-
ferred to transfer appreciated property to political organizations.
The traditional IRS view that the transfer constituted a gift meant
that the contributor incurred no income tax liability for the dona-
tion. In addition, the political organization paid no tax when it
disposed of the property, because Congress and the Service pursued
a policy of de facto tax exemption for political organizations. 12 Sen-
ator Alan Cranston, who introduced a bill'23 to close this loophole,
estimated the resulting loss of tax on the appreciation at $5 million
for 1972 alone. 24
Senator Cranston's proposal sealed the loophole by taxing the
contributor on the appreciation at the time the property was trans-
ferred to the political entity. Although the events precipitating the
adoption of the Cranston position125 at times resembled Senator
Williams' exposes, more than intense political pressure motivated
Congress to tax contributors on the appreciation of donated prop-
erty. Soon after the introduction of the Cranston bill, the IRS had
ruled that the political organization receiving appreciated prop-
erty-not the contributor-would be subject to taxation. 26 Moreo-
ver, the Service planned to tax political organizations on all appre-
ciation, including appreciation that had accrued before the donee
organization received the property. This approach was consistent
with the Service's view that the contribution of appreciated prop-
erty constituted a gift: the political organization was required to
take the donor's basis and to recognize gain, upon a subsequent
disposition of the property, in an amount equal to the difference
contributors to officials not yet running for office, because the credit is available for newsletter
fund contributions in years when campaign contributions are not being made.
12 See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
1" S.2332, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 27469 (1973).
124 Id.
,2n The Cranston proposal was enacted as part of the Upholstery Regulators Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-625, § 13(a)(1), 88 Stat. 2108 (1975)(codified at I.R.C. § 84).
26 Rev. Rul. 74-23, 1974-1 C.B. 17, 18; Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14, 16. See note 80 supra
and accompanying text. The Service had acted after a year of review prompted by The Wall
Street Journal's embarrassing disclosure of the appreciated property gambit. See Landauer,
supra note 71. Within a week after the article appeared, the IRS announced that it would
solicit comments in anticipation of hearings on the tax treatment of contributions of appre-
ciated property. IRS, Press Release No. 1257 (Oct. 3, 1972). The Service's ruling, although
retroactive, covered only sales of appreciated property made after October 3, 1972, thus
permitting much of the gain realized by the Nixon and McGovern political committees to
escape taxation. H. ALExANDER, supra note 1, at 363. But see note 129 infra.
[Vol. 65:513
HeinOnline  -- 65 Va. L. Rev.  544 1979
1979] Taxation of Campaign Finance
between the carryover basis with adjustments and the fair market
value. ,27
The Service's ruling would have imposed significant tax burdens
on political organizations. In addition to imposing almost unavoida-
ble income tax liability, the IRS position mandated full-scale re-
porting requirements for political organizations and ongoing IRS
auditing and oversight of organization activities. Faced with this
prospect, Congress opted for the Cranston proposal,'2 assuring at
least that the tax burden would fall on the contributor.' 29 The donee
would take a stepped-up basis in the contributed property, which
would produce a minimal tax liability if the organization followed
the usual procedure of promptly disposing of the property for cash,
and IRS involvement in the affairs of political organizations would
be curtailed significantly.
C. The New Role of the Service in Campaign Finance
Congress responded in a superficial and predictable manner to
the Service's efforts to impose a scheme of taxation on campaign
"2 The Service received position papers urging it to adopt a stance taxing the contributor
rather than the donee. According to one theory, an implicit agreement existed between the
parties, providing that the donee should sell the property for the donor. A second theory
advanced the notion that the access to a candidate gained by making a contribution was a
realization event. For a discussion of these responses to the IRS, see 23 CATH. U.L. Rav. 322,
331-33 (1973). See also Note, supra note 9, at 34-35, discussing the administrative problems
with the Service's approach. The most serious problem is that the likelihood of collecting tax
from campaign organizations is slim because many committees are insolvent or defunct after
the election. 23 CATH. U.L. Rav. 322, 334 (1973). The Democratic National Committee, for
example, had a $9.3 million debt after the 1972 election. Id. at 331 n.41, 334.
' Senator Cranston had emphasized the potential "for harassing and possibly intimidat-
ing opposition political parties [through the use of audits]" if the political organization,
rather than the contributor, were taxed upon the disposition of contributed appreciated
property. 119 CONG. REC. 27469 (1973).
"2 I.R.C. § 84. Under § 84(a), the donor realizes an amount equal to the fair market value
of the property transferred. Although the fair market value could be determined when the
donee subsequently disposes of the property, Congress preferred to measure the value at the
time the property is contributed. The contributor thus knows the extent of his income tax
liability at the time of the contribution. H.R. REp. No. 1502, supra note 45, at 110. As usual,
gain is computed as the difference between the amount realized (in this case, the fair market
value of the contributed property) and the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the
contributor. See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), 1011, 1012, 1016.
Section 84 operates retroactively for transfers made after May 7, 1974. It has been suggested
that saving the Nixon and McGovern campaign committees taxes on gain from appreciated
property owed pursuant to certain revenue rulings was the primary motivation behind the
legislation. See note 126 infra. As a result of the new law, the Nixon campaign saved an
estimated $500,000, and the McGovern campaign an estimated $300,000, in taxes. H.
ALExANDER, supra note 1, at 363.
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finance. Eager to enact specific provisions to counteract the Ser-
vice's broad initiatives, the drafters failed to recognize the full im-
plications of the new legislation. Although Congress succeeded in
codifying an income tax exemption for political organizations, this
statutory exemption represented a significant departure from the
previous de facto exemption. The de facto exemption scheme
essentially insulated all campaign finance from the income tax laws.
In contrast, a statutory exemption would be available only upon
explicit satisfaction of the prerequisites spelled out in the statute.
Formal adherence to the statute would control, and the IRS alone
would be responsible for assuring compliance with the law. Al-
though granting tax exemption, the 1974 codification necessarily
presaged IRS intrusion into the political process, at least to deter-
mine whether tax exemption would be permitted in particular cases.
The sponsors of the legislation also overlooked the problems in-
herent in translating legislative intent into law. Because the legisla-
tion lacked any clear expression of policy objectives,1 31 considerable
doubt arises regarding the meanings of operative terms. Regulations
proposed by the IRS 131 indicate that the Service, which has author-
ity to promulgate regulations and to issue interpretive rulings, 32
intends to take a major role in defining compliance with the statute.
The statutory provisions that define political organizations, tax-
Il Although a statement expressing the need to weigh loss of revenue against encourage-
ment of political participation accompanied the legislation, Congress made no real inquiry
into the balance. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
131 The regulations were proposed on Nov. 24, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 51840 (1976). A notice of
public hearing on the proposed regulations appeared in the Federal Register on Jan. 31, 1977.
42 Fed. Reg. 5704 (1977). The Service has received numerous comments on the regulations,
most of which question the technical meaning of key terms. See Comments on Proposed
Regulations to I.R.C. § 527, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association.
1 I.R.C. § 7805(a) provides that "the Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the internal revenue laws. The regula-
tions issued pursuant to § 7805(a) are interpretive in nature and carry great weight in court.
See E. GIuswoLD & M. GIATz, FEDERAL INcoME TAxAnoN: PRiNCIPLES AND POLICIEs 46 (1976).
Particular sections of the Code often grant additional authority. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167,
385(a), 1502. These regulations have been described as being "legislative" in nature and
as having the "force of law unless it could be shown that the regulations are unreasonable or
beyond the power delegated to Treasury by the Congress." E. GRIswoLD & M. GR arz, supra,
at 46. The Secretary of the Treasury in turn has delegated authority to issue regulations to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, subject to the approval of the Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy. Id. at 47.
In addition to regulations, the Service issues interpretive rulings on the basis of a stated
set of facts. Usually, rulings are issued in response to taxpayer requests for interpretation or
clarification of tax provisions. The Service may publish the ruling or reply by letter to the
inquiring taxpayer. See I FEDERAL INComE TAxTroN, supra note 6, at 59, 62.
546
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exempt revenue from fundraising events, and expenditures giving
rise to taxable income represent the more striking areas of legisla-
tive ambiguity inviting interpretive intervention by the IRS.
1. Political Organization
To qualify for tax exemption, an entity must be a "political or-
ganization."' A political entity that fails to qualify as a political
organization may be subject to taxation on contributions and other
receipts, even if the funds are used for admittedly political pur-
poses. 34 Moreover, contributors are subject to gift tax on all trans-
fers of money or property to an entity that is not classified as a
political organization. 135 Failure to qualify very likely would result
in seriously reduced funding, making competition with other politi-
cal organizations difficult.
The new law defines a "political organization" capable of qualify-
ing for tax exemption as an entity "organized and operated
primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contri-
butions or making expenditures. . . for an exempt function." 3 ' An
exempt function in turn is defined as "influencing or attempting to
influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office in a
political organization. ' 13 The statute, however, does not define the
term "primarily," and the IRS clearly intends to retain considerable
discretion in establishing the meaning of the word. For example, the
proposed regulations provide that "[i]n making the determination
of whether a political organization is 'organized and operated pri-
marily to carry on an exempt function' all the facts and circumstan-
ces of each case shall be considered, '1
'3 I.R.C. § 527(a).
"I The statute does not delineate the proper tax treatment of entities that do not qualify
as political organizations. These organizations presumably would be subject to income taxa-
tion on contributions. See Golden, supra note 2, at 247-49.
"I I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5) exempts from gift taxation only transfers to a political organization
"within the meaning of section 527(e)(1)."
I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (emphasis added).
,3 Id. § 527(e)(2). See note 95 supra. This definition does not address political organiza-
tions that advocate a specific issue rather than support a particular candidate. Conversely,
the breadth of the definition could bring within the scope of I.R.C. § 527 organizations that
otherwise would be tax exempt under I.R.C. § 501, e.g., the League of Women Voters. See
Streng, supra note 2, at 145-46.
I" Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(a)(4). The IRS has held that surplus campaign funds
from an earlier campaign spent by a legislator to attend a political convention as a delegate
were expended for an exempt function. The separate bank account in which the funds had
1979]
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The proposed IRS regulations provide that, in the absence of
"other relevant factors," an organization satisfies the primary pur-
pose test if its articles of organization confirm that it was organized
to carry on an exempt function. 19 The proposed regulations do not
specify what additional factors will be considered relevant.4 ' An
organization may satisfy the primary purpose test notwithstanding
the fact that it has no formal documents evidencing its formation,
provided that it has not spent more than an "insubstantial" amount
of money on nonexempt and nonqualifying activities. The proposed
regulations identify qualifying activities as including those that
"reasonably relate to the selection, nomination, or election of indi-
viduals for the next applicable political campaign." The terms
"insubstantial" and "reasonably relate," however, are not de-
fined.' The IRS presumably will construe the meanings of these
expressions.
2. Fundraising Events
Fundraising events-a traditional mainstay of campaign fi-
nance'l 2-recently have gained even greater prominence as candi-
dates stage more performances by leading entertainers to encourage
political contributions.4 3 According to the Service's proposed regu-
lations, the income from a fundraising activity that is "[s]ub-
stantially related to the exempt function" of the sponsoring organi-
zation will be tax-free.' To be "substantially related," a fund-
been kept qualified as a political organization. See. generally Rev. Rul. 79-11, I.R.B. 1979-2,
8. In a second ruling, the Service held that expenditure of surplus funds from a previous
campaign for voter research, polls, and canvasses was also an exempt function. Rev. Rul. 79-
13, I.R.B. 1979-2, 9.
"I' Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(a)(4).
10 The proposed regulations do suggest that the ratio of expenditures used for an exempt
function to total expenditures for all purposes is a "principle" relevant factor. Id.
" Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(a)(6). Recently, the Service ruled that a separate bank
account in which a political candidate deposited campaign funds and then withdrew the
funds for bona fide campaign expenses was a political organization. Rev. Rul. 79-11, I.R.B.
1979-2, 8.
M In his classic work on campaign finance, Alexander Heard noted that "[o]f all the new
contrivances devised since the First New Deal to meet the costs of politics, the fund-raising
dinner is the most important." A. HEARD, THE CosTS oF DEMOCRACy 233 (1960). For an
analysis of the fiscal importance and financial efficiency of fundraising dinners, see id. at
234-45.
"1 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 4, 1972, at 30, col. 4 (describing Warren Beatty's lavish
and successful fundraising dinners and benefit concerts for Presidential candidate George
McGovern).
" Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.527-3(b)(4)(i)(A). The fundraising event may not be carried
on "in the ordinary course of a trade or business." Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.527-3(b)(4)(i) (B).
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raising event must have "a causal relationship to the achievement
of the exempt function (other than through the production of funds)
and [it is] substantially related for purposes of this section only if
the causal relationship is a substantial one.""14 A substantial rela-
tionship will not exist "[w]here the activities do not contribute
importantly to the exempt function." '146 The IRS has reserved for its
own determination the meanings of "substantially" and
"importantly," as well as the definition of the proper causal rela-
tionship: "Whether the activities productive of gross income con-
tribute importantly to the accomplishment of the exempt function
depends in each case upon the facts and circumstances involved." '47
Income exceeding that needed to carry on an exempt function will
not be exempt when it is derived from activities "which are con-
ducted on a larger scale than necessary for the performance" of an
exempt function."' The Service has not specified what standards it
will employ to determine what is "a larger scale than necessary."
Whatever these terms mean, the Service clearly intends to make
itself the arbiter of acceptable modes of staging fundraising events.
3. Expenditures Giving Rise to Taxable Income
In exempting political organizations from income taxation, the
statute carefully limits the exemption to certain types of receipts:
contributions, membership dues and fees, proceeds from political
fundraising and entertainment events, and receipts from the sale of
political campaign materials.' Funds derived from these sources
must be segregated and used for an exempt function; all other in-
come is subject to taxation.15 The proposed regulations take the
statutory limitation a step further, requiring each organization to
report as gross income any income that would otherwise be exempt
function income but that is expended for "making improvements or
15 Proposed Treas.-Reg. § 1.527-3(b)(4)(ii)(B).
14 Id.
147 Id.
", Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.527-3(b)(4)(ii)(C).
"' I.R.C. § 527(c)(3). See note 95 supra. Section 527 incorporates the definition of
"contribution" set forth in I.R.C. § 271(b)(2). I.R.C. § 527(e)(3).
'$ Political organizations' taxable income is defined in I.R.C. § 527(c)(1) as the excess of
"(A) the gross income for the taxable year (excluding any exempt function income), over (B)
the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of
the gross income (excluding exempt function income)." This general formula is subject to
certain modifications. I.R.C. § 527(c)(2). A specific deduction of $100 is allowed; however,
no deduction is allowed under I.R.C. § 172 for a net operating loss or under part VmI of
subchapter B, which provides special deductions for corporations. Id.
1979]
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additions to its facilities or for equipment which are not necessary
for or used in carrying out its exempt function." 15 The proposed
regulations offer no guidance regarding which improvements, addi-
tions, or equipment will be deemed "necessary." Thus at a time
when the political campaign is undergoing a radical transformation
into a highly scientific, sophisticated activity managed by profes-
sionals, 52 the Service's discretion over the taxation of campaign
funds gives it considerable power to influence the scope and rate of
that transformation.
D. The Service's History of and Potential for Abuse of the Political
Process
There is no inherent impropriety in the discretionary exercise of
the Service's power to promulgate regulations and to issue interpre-
tative rulings to fill in the gaps that Congress left in a bareboned
tax statute. The present statutory scheme is troubling, however,
because it gives an extremely potent administrative agency the op-
portunity to affect directly the political process. Such power should
not be accorded to any executive agency unless Congress has consid-
ered fully the consequences of the delegation and has inquired into
alternative approaches that might involve less potential for intru-
sion into the political process.
The many well-established instances of IRS abuse suggest that
the Service simply cannot withstand political pressure. For decades
the Service failed to tax the income of political organizations, al-
though no explicit statutory exemption existed. This is sympto-
matic of a chronic vulnerability to political pressure that raises
questions regarding the Service's ability to enforce the new law in a
nonpartisan fashion.51 The favorable private letter rulings issued to
Democratic contributors in 1952 and the ruling on gift tax commit-
tees issued some twenty years later for the benefit of Republican
contributors confirm that this political sensitivity favors no one
political party, but rather has surfaced during administrations dom-
inated by each major party. The assault on the Communist Party
indicates the Service's susceptibility to temptation to misuse the
tax laws against fringe parties and candidates.'54
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.527-4(a)(1).
152 See note 57 supra. See also H. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 340-44.
15 For a history of the Service's contradictory and dissembling policy statements, see note
47 supra.
"I The Service has attempted to impose tax liability selectively not only on the Communist
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Indeed, one of the most troubling aspects of the new law is the
legitimation of IRS involvement in the political process. Because
the standards for determining tax-exempt status remain so vague,
the Service reasonably can justify intrusive rulings by arguing that
it merely is playing its proper and necessary role in interpreting the
law. Although any political organization or candidate can challenge
an IRS determination, the remedy has no value if fundraising efforts
are stalled and an election is lost in the interim.
The tremendous authority of the Service will not be limited to
taxation of candidates seeking federal office. The law applies to the
political process at every level: national, state, and local. 1 5 Moreo-
ver, the statute is not restricted to electoral candidates but extends
to funds received and expended in an effort to influence the appoint-
ment of an individual to public office.156 This IRS involvement in
campaign finance at every level of government fundamentally alters
the electoral process in practical as well as theoretical ways. The
Party, but also on other political organizations. See notes 47-48 supra. Recently, the IRS has
been used against noncandidate officials of the major political party that is out of pover and
against independent citizens who have criticized the party in power. See Hearings Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 803-a Resolution Authorizing and
Directing the Comm. on the Judiciary to Investigate Whether Sufficient Grounds Exist for
the House of Representatives to Exercise its Constitutional Power to Impeach Richard M.
Nixon, President of the United States, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 217-35 (1974) (detailing the
repeated investigations of Democratic Party National Chairman Lawrence O'Brien ordered
by White House aide John Ehrlichman); id. at 95-96, 102 (IRS harassment of persons listed
on former President Nixon's "enemies list"). For a thorough consideration of executive at-
tempts to use the IRS against political enemies, see Center on Corp. Responsibility, Inc. v.
Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D.D.C. 1973). See also Tax Reform Research Group v. I.R.S.,
419 F. Supp. 415 (D.D.C. 1976) (detailing specific documents and transcribed conversations
concerning use of the IRS against selected taxpayers).
Apparently not only President Nixon attempted to politicize the Service. E.g., V. LASKY,
IT DIDN'T START WITH WATERGATE 55-58, 60-62, 132, 134-35, 139 (1977) (alleging similar
manipulation of the IRS by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson). See B. BRADLEE, CONVERSA-
TIONS wrrH KENNEDY 218 (1975). See also N.Y. Times, May 8, 1974, at 1, col. 7. President
Johnson allegedly used the IRS against Senator John Williams, who was responsible for
eliminating the bad debt and advertising expense deductions in campaign finance. See notes
26-34 supra and accompanying text. According to Lasky, Senator Williams' efforts to expose
the sordid dealings of Johnson's close associate Bobby Baker prompted the IRS harassment.
See V. LASKY, supra, at 135, 139. Based on a meticulous audit of Senator Williams' tax
returns, the Service determined that he actually was entitled to a refund. Id.
'" See notes 133-41 supra and accompanying text.
,5, Some commentators have expressed concern that this provision will bring organizations
that are not political in the narrow sense of the term within the scope of I.R.C. § 527. For
example, activities of the National Association of Broadcasters supporting or opposing a
candidate for appointment to the Federal Communications Commission could bring the
organization within the scope of the § 527 definition of a political organization. See Streng,
supra note 2, at 146.
1979]
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proposed regulations would require every organization with an ex-
empt fund to "maintain adequate records to allow the verification
of receipts into and expenditures out of such fund.' ' 57 The record
requirement would open the most intimate details of every cam-
paign to IRS scrutiny and would reveal the political affiliation of
each contributor.'58 Maintaining sufficient records will impose a
major additional cost on political organizations, in many cases re-
quiring substantial accounting, legal, and clerical assistance.
HIL. CONCLUSION
The history of federal taxation of campaign finance is marked by
Congress's self-serving determination to bar any restrictions on the
free flow of funds to political campaigns. Congress initially accom-
plished this objective through a de facto exemption that effectively
insulated the system of campaign finance from the vagaries of tax
law as well as from the dangers of heavy-handed IRS enforcement.' 59
Congress's early success in maintaining a tax-free system of cam-
paign finance depended to a large extent on IRS cooperation, which
Congress received despite the absence of a statutory exemption for
campaign finance. During this period the Service had little interest
in tangling with the legislators who control the agency's budget. In
addition, the IRS felt only weak political pressure to enforce the tax
laws.
,57 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(a)(3).
'" Unlike the verification contemplated by the Service in regulations under I.R.C. § 41
(granting a credit for political contributions), the contributor here could not conceal his
identity by choosing not to claim the income tax credit. Congress has enacted several broad
disclosure provisions in connection with its regulation of campaign finance, but these provi-
sions have been marked by constitutional and political controversy and have lacked effective
enforcement machinery. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text. Thus, IRS auditing
of political entities would represent a quantum leap in the federal government's capacity to
cause mischief in the political process. Moreover, these deleterious effects would extend
beyond federal elections to the state and local level. For a history of campaign finance
disclosure and enforcement legislation, see D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 1, at 83-115;
Fleming, Regulation of Campaign Financing, 1976 ANN. SutvY AM. LAw 649. For incisive
views of the continuing political struggle to control the Federal Election Commission, the
agency charged with enforcement of disclosure and contribution limitations in federal elec-
tions, see 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 242 (1979); id. at 329; 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3109
(1978); id. at 1056; 35 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2522 (1977). States have encountered similar
difficulties with disclosure. See generally CAMPAIGN MONEY: REFORM AND REALITY IN THE
STATES (H. Alexander ed. 1976); Comment, Loophole Legislation-State Campaign Finance
Laws, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 983, 985-89, 992-98 (1967)-
"I See notes 4-35 supra and accompanying text. Congress deviated from this pattern to
enact remedial legislation on only two occasions, when it felt intense political pressure to
eliminate patently abusive techniques. See notes 26-34 supra and accompanying text.
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The system of de facto tax exemption finally collapsed when Con-
gress's interest in stimulating campaign finance and the Service's
concern with erasing public doubts about its integrity diverged.
Congress substituted for the de facto exemption system a statutory
scheme bearing the characteristics of congressional activity in this
area of the law: the statute was a hastily drafted, poorly conceived
agglomeration of disparate responses to the Service's efforts to re-
strict the free flow of campaign funds. Although Congress spoke of
the need to strike a balance between the concern with assuring
adequate financing for the political process and the concern with
protecting tax revenue, the legislation as enacted safeguards neither
of these interests. The provisions exempting contributors from gift
taxation, and political organizations from income taxation, reduce
government revenue.5 0 In addition, the need to determine which
contributors and organizations satisfy the statute's prerequisites for
tax exemption-a determination made especially important be-
cause of the ambiguity of those requirements-virtually guarantees
continuing IRS involvement in campaign finance.
Drafting a statute that adequately accommodates the often diver-
gent goals of the federal taxation and campaign finance systems
admittedly presents a difficult task. The interest in a tax-free sys-
tem of campaign finance must be balanced against the inevitable
loss of revenue."' The legislature must confront difficult issues, in-
cluding whether the tax laws should be used to subsidize and stimu-
late campaign finance 62 and, if so, who should benefit from the
I" Most political organizations have a life-span coterminous with the election. Even those
organizations that operate past the election rarely have capital to invest. The current statu-
tory framework thus may impose significant IRS intrusion on political organizations without
any corresponding benefit from the augmented revenue flow. In this sense, the development
is more troubling than recent legislation restricting the amount of contributions and requiring
their public disclosure. See notes 111 & 158 supra. Limiting and disclosing contributions at
least may encourage broader political participation and dilute the presumed power of wealthy
contributors. Moreover, the agency charged with enforcing this legislation does not have the
resources, expertise, or power to threaten the political process in the way IRS involvement
does.
M For example, it might be found that tax-exempt political organizations provide conven-
ient tax shelters for contributors and candidates. In contrast, it might be concluded that there
is little risk of abuse and that a complex statute involving considerable IRS oversight is
unnecessary.
"I This particular concern goes to one of the fundamental debates in taxation: the extent
to which the system can and should be "neutral." See generally Surrey, Tax Incentives as a
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1970). For example, the check-off system actually may
result in less public influence over candidates because funds are allocated entirely on past
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subsidies and incentives"5 3 and how the laws should be imple-
mented. ' Drafters also must assess the extent of IRS involvement
and the concomitant risks posed to the political process. Regardless
of how these issues are resolved, it is necessary for Congress finally
to confront them. The integrity of the political process is now at
stake, and the time has come for a thoroughgoing debate to com-
mence.
party performance and the law does not permit taxpayers to designate the candidate to whom
the money will go. Despite the Supreme Court's failure to so hold in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), see note 55 supra, the check-off system also appears to discriminate against
third parties. See, e.g., the especially harsh remarks of former Senator Eugene McCarthy, a
1976 independent Presidential candidate, in REGULATION OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, supra note
116, at 2, 7-9, 14-17.
'" A recent example of this problem is the deduction permitted for contributions to a
newsletter fund or to a candidate in the year prior to the announcement of his candidacy,
a provision that favors incumbents. See notes 112-21 supra and accompanying text.
"I Tax laws do not always accomplish the intended objective. A recent example of this is
David Adamany's finding that credits and deductions have not encouraged broad-based
financing of the political process. See Adamany, supra note 5, at 4.
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